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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
The recent rise in China's inflation has grabbed the attention of the public and policymakers alike. Consumer price inflation rose to 4.4 percent in October and a further increase is expected. This is higher than we are used to in China, although it is modest in an emerging market perspective. To determine the best policy response to the rise in inflation it is important to know its cause and how much inflation we should expect in the coming 12 months. It is also good to decide what an acceptable rate of inflation is for a country like China.
So far, the rise in inflation is because of higher food prices. The food component1 of the consumer pice index in October was up 10.1 percent year-on-year, contributing two-thirds of overall inflation, while non-food prices were up 1.6 percent on this basis. In looking for the cause of the higher food prices, monetarist explanations are common.
After the massive monetary2 expansion since the end of 2008 there is a lot of liquidity3 sloshing around, potentially putting upward pressure on prices, especially asset prices. In this setting, there are reports that speculative4 activity has driven up prices of several food products.
It is also true that in the long run sustained monetary expansion drives up inflation. However, the link from money to inflation is more indirect and complex than simplistic monetarist interpretations5 suggest and, in the meantime, inflation is basically determined6 on the markets for goods and services.
Several food markets have been buffeted7 by domestic supply shocks. In particular, vegetable prices, which have seen the largest price rises, have been hit by bad weather and natural disasters. Recent hikes in international food prices have added pressure. China's rice and wheat prices do not closely follow international prices, since they are managed by policymakers.
However, prices of corn and soybeans in China follow international prices fairly closely, and higher prices for these products have helped raise meat and egg prices. Housing-related costs have also contributed. However, prices other than those of food and housing remain contained - in October, they were up 0.8 percent year-on-year.
Inflation is unlikely to escalate8 but expectations matter and there are risks. Food prices are unlikely to continue to rise at the recent pace. Domestically, the supply side factors driving up prices are considered in large part temporary. Internationally, after the hefty increases in prices of raw commodities such as food and many industrial commodities since early summer, mainstream9 forecasters do not expect them to continue to increase at this pace.
More generally, despite further quantitative10 easing in the US, global inflation prospects11 are generally considered modest, largely because of substantial spare capacity in many markets globally. Indeed, the US just registered the lowest rate of core inflation since records began in 1957.
There is some risk that the higher food prices will spill over into wages and other prices. This risk is manageable but it requires policy attention. People typically resist real wage declines if they can. Thus, large rises in prices of food or energy are often followed by wage hikes. This can set in motion a wage-price spiral, especially in a low productivity growth environment.
In China, price shocks tend to be more easily absorbed than in many other countries because of robust12 productivity and wage growth, and core inflation is low to start with because of the rapid productivity growth in industry. Nonetheless, with inflation expectations having risen substantially and the labor13 market less loose than it used to be, macroeconomic policy will need to play an important role in limiting the spillover of food prices into other prices and wages.
The risks of inflation and the need to manage inflation expectations strengthen the case for normalizing the monetary stance. Indeed, with little spare capacity in China's economy, respectable growth prospects, and concerns about too rapid housing price increases, this normalization14 will need to be a central objective of macroeconomic policy.
Thus, after the spectacular increase in monetary aggregates15 since the end of 2008, monetary growth will before long need to come down to rates broadly similar to nominal16 growth.
Moreover, relying more on interest rates and less on quantitative instruments such as credit controls would help reduce the underlying17 pressures on asset prices and reduce distortions. In October, People's Bank of China raised benchmark interest rates by 25 basis points. But they are still much lower than before the crisis and they will have to go up more.
Concerns about the impact of financial capital inflows are overdone18 and are no good reason not to increase interest rates. Thanks to China's largely effective capital controls, the amount of net financial inflows (called "hot money" in China) is actually very low compared to domestic credit creation. Also, the overwhelming majority of the increase in foreign reserves is not from net financial capital flows but from current account surpluses and net foreign direct investment.
However, the inflation outlook does not seem problematic enough to warrant surpressing overall inflation by administrative19 measures or postponing20 needed price adjustments. High inflation is distortive and not helpful. However, in rapidly growing countries like China, relative prices need to change to facilitate changes in the economic structure. In most emerging markets moderate inflation - of 4-5 percent - is not seen as a major problem.
Constraining21 inflation to be very low could hinder helpful relative price changes. For instance, China needs to increase administrative prices for resources and utilities - especially energy and water - to help adjust the structure of the economy. And, higher prices for agricultural products and higher migrant wages can help boost rural incomes and reduce urban-rural inequality, thus helping22 to improve the primary income distribution.
It would be really unfortunate if such desirable developments were suppressed because of concerns about moderate inflation. Thus, somewhat higher tolerance23 to modest inflation could help bring about some of the structural24 reform and change that the government is aiming for.
The author is a senior economist25 at World Bank Office in Beijing.
1 component | |
n.组成部分,成分,元件;adj.组成的,合成的 | |
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2 monetary | |
adj.货币的,钱的;通货的;金融的;财政的 | |
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3 liquidity | |
n.流动性,偿债能力,流动资产 | |
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4 speculative | |
adj.思索性的,暝想性的,推理的 | |
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5 interpretations | |
n.解释( interpretation的名词复数 );表演;演绎;理解 | |
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6 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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7 buffeted | |
反复敲打( buffet的过去式和过去分词 ); 连续猛击; 打来打去; 推来搡去 | |
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8 escalate | |
v.(使)逐步增长(或发展),(使)逐步升级 | |
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9 mainstream | |
n.(思想或行为的)主流;adj.主流的 | |
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10 quantitative | |
adj.数量的,定量的 | |
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11 prospects | |
n.希望,前途(恒为复数) | |
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12 robust | |
adj.强壮的,强健的,粗野的,需要体力的,浓的 | |
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13 labor | |
n.劳动,努力,工作,劳工;分娩;vi.劳动,努力,苦干;vt.详细分析;麻烦 | |
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14 normalization | |
n.(normalisation)正常化,标准化 | |
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15 aggregates | |
数( aggregate的名词复数 ); 总计; 骨料; 集料(可成混凝土或修路等用的) | |
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16 nominal | |
adj.名义上的;(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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17 underlying | |
adj.在下面的,含蓄的,潜在的 | |
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18 overdone | |
v.做得过分( overdo的过去分词 );太夸张;把…煮得太久;(工作等)过度 | |
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19 administrative | |
adj.行政的,管理的 | |
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20 postponing | |
v.延期,推迟( postpone的现在分词 ) | |
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21 constraining | |
强迫( constrain的现在分词 ); 强使; 限制; 约束 | |
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22 helping | |
n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的,辅助的 | |
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23 tolerance | |
n.宽容;容忍,忍受;耐药力;公差 | |
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24 structural | |
adj.构造的,组织的,建筑(用)的 | |
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25 economist | |
n.经济学家,经济专家,节俭的人 | |
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