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美国国家公共电台 NPR--FBI finds information about a foreign country's nuclear program in Mar-a-Lago search

时间:2023-08-23 03:22来源:互联网 提供网友:nan   字体: [ ]
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FBI finds information about a foreign country's nuclear program in Mar-a-Lago search

Transcript1

NPR's A Martinez talks to former CIA officer David Priess about reports that some of America's most closely guarded secrets were among documents seized from Donald Trump2's Florida estate.

A MART?NEZ, HOST:

We're learning more about the documents seized by the FBI while searching the former President Donald Trump's Florida estate. The Washington Post says some of America's most closely guarded secrets were among those found last month at Mar-a-Lago. The Post report also says a document on a foreign nation's nuclear weapons program was recovered. We're joined now by someone who knows the intelligence world very well, David Preiss, a former intelligence officer and daily intelligence briefer at the CIA. David, The Post says some of the documents contain information so secret that only a handful of government officials would even have access. What kind of information are we talking about that requires that kind of secrecy3?

DAVID PRIESS: Yeah, that's true of a lot of very specialized4 sources and methods information or information that was very difficult to obtain on what the intelligence business calls hard targets. These are the countries or terrorist groups or other foreign actors whom have extensive denial and deception5 programs to inhibit6 intelligence collection or are just very closed societies and therefore hard to penetrate7 and get essential information from. The whole purpose of those SAPS, those protective compartments8, is to ensure that very few people see that information so that the risk of disclosure stays very low and that method of intelligence collection can continue into the future.

MART?NEZ: And when you say hard to obtain, are you talking very dangerous?

PRIESS: It often can be in two ways. One way is if it's human collection, the traditional spy craft - you're trying to recruit someone who is close to a foreign leader or who has access to another country's nuclear program. That person would be at high risk if their identity were exposed or if even the other country knew that there was collection going on with someone in a position like that. There's also the danger of technical collection - that is, listening in on communications of another government. If that government knows that their communications are being listened to in some way, that their own measures have been defeated, then they can take countermeasures and prevent that collection in the future. And that could put at risk U.S. personnel overseas, whether diplomatic or military.

MART?NEZ: And they might still be in a vulnerable spot. What is the risk to national security if that kind of information gets out?

PRIESS: Yeah, it comes directly and indirectly9. The most direct is, of course, the risk to an intelligence asset, as I mentioned, or the risk to U.S. personnel overseas. The indirect, however, is probably larger, especially over the long term, with this many documents potentially being exposed, which is the damage to U.S. intelligence collection in a variety of areas. It could also be that there's information the U.S. is seeking that is being reported in these documents. So it becomes evident that the United States is interested in certain topics that perhaps foreign governments did not know the United States was trying to collect on to enhance its national security. And once a foreign government knows that, it becomes harder and harder to get that information and therefore harder to inform national security decision-makers. They operate in a greater area of uncertainty10 in future decisions if their intelligence channel is limited.

MART?NEZ: David, when you were handling classified information in your role at the CIA, what kind of precautions did you have to take?

PRIESS: We had many precautions. First of all, there are many personnel precautions, which is everybody goes through extensive background investigation11, polygraphs, frequent reinvestigations in order to hold a security clearance12, especially at a top-secret SCI level. So to see even those documents before you get to compartments, you have extensive background checks and things. Of course, this is not true of a president. A president has a de facto security clearance simply by being elected under the Constitution of the United States. There is no formal security clearance for a president.

But then you actually have physical measures that are taken for documents, such as the kind we saw in the Department of Justice photo. Those measures include secure storage. You look at those documents only in a secure facility. When moving between secure facilities, you transport them in a safe way. That can include locked bags. It can include multiple layers of defense13, meaning double wrapping tapes. It can involve armed escorts for certain kinds of documents. I know that when I took the president's daily brief into the White House, I had a driver take me right up there. I had a locked bag to make sure that the documents I had were secure, and that was walking into the White House itself. Those documents did not come out until I was in the office of the national security adviser14.

MART?NEZ: One more thing quickly, David - so when a president has documents, classified documents, do people know that that person - that the president has them, or can the president just walk down the office and go grab them?

PRIESS: In a normally functioning White House, yes. The issue here is we do not know the exact paper flow within the Trump White House and whether all the normal protocols15 were followed.

MART?NEZ: David Priess is a former CIA intelligence officer. He's also the publisher and chief operating officer at Lawfare. David, thanks a lot.

PRIESS: You bet.


点击收听单词发音收听单词发音  

1 transcript JgpzUp     
n.抄本,誊本,副本,肄业证书
参考例句:
  • A transcript of the tapes was presented as evidence in court.一份录音带的文字本作为证据被呈交法庭。
  • They wouldn't let me have a transcript of the interview.他们拒绝给我一份采访的文字整理稿。
2 trump LU1zK     
n.王牌,法宝;v.打出王牌,吹喇叭
参考例句:
  • He was never able to trump up the courage to have a showdown.他始终鼓不起勇气摊牌。
  • The coach saved his star player for a trump card.教练保留他的明星选手,作为他的王牌。
3 secrecy NZbxH     
n.秘密,保密,隐蔽
参考例句:
  • All the researchers on the project are sworn to secrecy.该项目的所有研究人员都按要求起誓保守秘密。
  • Complete secrecy surrounded the meeting.会议在绝对机密的环境中进行。
4 specialized Chuzwe     
adj.专门的,专业化的
参考例句:
  • There are many specialized agencies in the United Nations.联合国有许多专门机构。
  • These tools are very specialized.这些是专用工具。
5 deception vnWzO     
n.欺骗,欺诈;骗局,诡计
参考例句:
  • He admitted conspiring to obtain property by deception.他承认曾与人合谋骗取财产。
  • He was jailed for two years for fraud and deception.他因为诈骗和欺诈入狱服刑两年。
6 inhibit C7jxT     
vt.阻止,妨碍,抑制
参考例句:
  • Don't let ego and greed inhibit clear thinking and hard work.不要让自我和贪婪妨碍清晰的思维和刻苦的工作。
  • They passed a law to inhibit people from parking in the street.他们通过一项法令以阻止人们在街上停车。
7 penetrate juSyv     
v.透(渗)入;刺入,刺穿;洞察,了解
参考例句:
  • Western ideas penetrate slowly through the East.西方观念逐渐传入东方。
  • The sunshine could not penetrate where the trees were thickest.阳光不能透入树木最浓密的地方。
8 compartments 4e9d78104c402c263f5154f3360372c7     
n.间隔( compartment的名词复数 );(列车车厢的)隔间;(家具或设备等的)分隔间;隔层
参考例句:
  • Your pencil box has several compartments. 你的铅笔盒有好几个格。 来自《简明英汉词典》
  • The first-class compartments are in front. 头等车室在前头。 来自《简明英汉词典》
9 indirectly a8UxR     
adv.间接地,不直接了当地
参考例句:
  • I heard the news indirectly.这消息我是间接听来的。
  • They were approached indirectly through an intermediary.通过一位中间人,他们进行了间接接触。
10 uncertainty NlFwK     
n.易变,靠不住,不确知,不确定的事物
参考例句:
  • Her comments will add to the uncertainty of the situation.她的批评将会使局势更加不稳定。
  • After six weeks of uncertainty,the strain was beginning to take its toll.6个星期的忐忑不安后,压力开始产生影响了。
11 investigation MRKzq     
n.调查,调查研究
参考例句:
  • In an investigation,a new fact became known, which told against him.在调查中新发现了一件对他不利的事实。
  • He drew the conclusion by building on his own investigation.他根据自己的调查研究作出结论。
12 clearance swFzGa     
n.净空;许可(证);清算;清除,清理
参考例句:
  • There was a clearance of only ten centimetres between the two walls.两堵墙之间只有十厘米的空隙。
  • The ship sailed as soon as it got clearance. 那艘船一办好离港手续立刻启航了。
13 defense AxbxB     
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩
参考例句:
  • The accused has the right to defense.被告人有权获得辩护。
  • The war has impacted the area with military and defense workers.战争使那个地区挤满了军队和防御工程人员。
14 adviser HznziU     
n.劝告者,顾问
参考例句:
  • They employed me as an adviser.他们聘请我当顾问。
  • Our department has engaged a foreign teacher as phonetic adviser.我们系已经聘请了一位外籍老师作为语音顾问。
15 protocols 66203c461b36a2af573149f0aa6164ff     
n.礼仪( protocol的名词复数 );(外交条约的)草案;(数据传递的)协议;科学实验报告(或计划)
参考例句:
  • There are also protocols on the testing of nuclear weapons. 也有关于核武器试验的协议。 来自辞典例句
  • Hardware components and software design of network transport protocols are separately introduced. 介绍系统硬件组成及网络传输协议的软件设计。 来自互联网
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TAG标签:   美国新闻  英语听力  NPR
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