About 80 per cent of the population of developing countries lives in countries whose populations are becoming better off. Billions live in countries that are developing very swiftly. But almost a billion people – 70 per cent of whom live in sub-Saharan Africa – are in economically stagnant or declining countries. In all, 58 countries are in this desperate condition. Yet, as Collier remarks: “An impoverished ghetto of 1bn people will be increasingly impossible for a comfortable world to tolerate.”

　　发展中国家约 80%的人口生活在人民日渐富裕的国家里。数十亿人生活在快速发展的国家中。但是，约有 10 亿人口——其中0%居住在撒哈拉以南的非洲国家——生活在经济陷入停顿或衰退的国家。总共有 58个国家处在这种绝望的境地。然而，正如柯里尔所言：“一个 10 亿人口的贫民区，将越来越不可能被舒适的世界所忍受。”

　　Collier argues that these countries have fallen into one, or more, of four traps from which it is virtually impossible to escape. These are the “conflict trap” , the “natural resources trap” , the trap of being “landlocked with bad neighbours” and the trap of “bad governance in a small country”.

　　柯里尔认为，这些国家陷入了四个几乎无法逃脱的陷阱中的一个或者几个。这四个陷阱是：“冲突陷阱”、“自然资源陷阱”、“有恶邻的内陆国家”陷阱，以及“小国治理不良”陷阱。

　　Seventy-three per cent of people in the bottom billion have been through civil war, 29 per cent are in countries dominated by the malign politics of natural resources, 30 per cent are in landlocked, resource-poor countries with bad neighbours and 76 per cent are in countries that have suffered long periods of bad governance and poor economic policies. Many have fallen into more than one of these traps.

　　在最底层的10亿人口中，有73%的人处于内战之中； 29%的人生活在不良自然资源政治主导的国家；30%的人处在恶邻包围、自然资源贫乏的内陆国家； 76%的人所在的国家长期处于治理糟糕、经济政策拙劣的环境中。许多国家落入了不止一个陷阱。

　　What is to be done? Collier argues that trade, for all its potential benefits, will not help the bottom billion. These countries are uncompetitive exporters of labour-intensive goods and services, given the low costs and established positions of Asian producers. They cannot compete with China or Vietnam. Similarly private capital does not flow to these countries, except to exploit their natural resources. The problem is the reverse: huge capital flight. Collier estimates that almost 40 per cent of Africa's private wealth was held abroad in 1990.

　　应该做些什么呢？柯里尔认为，贸易尽管有各种潜在好处，却不能帮助处于最底层的10亿人。鉴于亚洲生产商的低成本和成熟的市场地位，这些国家无法成为有竞争力的劳动密集型产品及服务的出口国。它们无法与中国或越南竞争。同样地，如果不是要利用它们的自然资源，私人资本也不会流入这些国家。问题恰好相反，这些国家面临巨额资本的外逃。柯里尔估计，1990年，非洲几乎40%的私人财富放在海外。

　　Collier is also skeptical of the ability of aid to make much of a difference, at least on its own. He believes aid can help – and has helped – the bottom billion. But it has been a holding operation, rather than the start of sustained growth. He is particularly skeptical of the view that unconditional budget support will work. We have, after all, already had an experiment with the consequences of unconditional finance: oil revenues. Debt relief – the darling of the aid lobbies – is the closest thing to oil revenues that the aid industry can provide, a point its proponents ignore.

　　柯里尔对援助——至少是援助本身——发挥作用的能力也持怀疑态度。他相信，援助可以帮助、并且已经帮助了最贫困的10亿人。但是，援助的作用是维持生计，而非启动持续增长。他对无条件预算支持能够奏效的观点尤其表示怀疑。毕竟，我们已经对无条件融资的后果进过实验：石油收入。援助游说者所青睐的债务减免，是援助行业能够提供的与石油收入最为接近的东西，其倡议者并没有注意到这一点。

　　Aid will not get countries out of the traps. It cannot stop conflict, though it can help after one is over. It can do nothing about the natural resources trap: indeed, it is similar to possessing just another natural resource. It may help landlocked countries with improved transport infrastructure, but cannot eliminate the catastrophe of having bad neighbours.

　　援助无法使这些国家摆脱陷阱。它无法停止冲突，尽管它可以在冲突结束后提供帮助。它对自然资源陷阱束手无策：事实上，它就像是拥有另一项自然资源。它可以帮助内陆国家改善交通设施，但无法消除拥有恶邻带来的灾难。

　　So what else is needed to help countries in the bottom billion? Collier makes three suggestions: first, military intervention; second, laws, statutes and charters for improved governance; and, third, trade preferences. The case for military intervention is most obvious, if controversial. Civil wars are so costly that well-timed military actions are quite likely (though not certain) to be cost-effective.

　　那么，需要做些什么来帮助最贫困的10亿人所在的国家呢？柯里尔提出了三条建议：首先，军事干预；第二，为改善治理而制定法律、条例及宪章；第三，贸易优惠。军事干预的做法虽然存在争议，但理由是最显而易见的。内战的代价如此高昂，因此，适时的军事行动很可能是成本有效的（尽管这不是必然的）。

　　The second area demands changes in high-income countries: ceasing to take money looted from the poorest countries is one such change; elimination of bribery by their companies is another. It also needs charters of better governance for countries in the bottom billion: transparent management of natural resources is among the most important, the UK's extractive industries transparency initiative being a good start. The book also suggests charters for democracy, budget transparency, post-conflict situations and investment.

　　另一个改变是不再接受从最贫穷的国家掠夺来的金钱；另一个是消除其企业的贿赂行为。最贫穷的 10 亿人所在的国家，还需要制定宪章，完善治理：自然资源的透明管理是其中最重要的举措之一，英国的采掘行业透明度行动计划 (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, EITI)就是一个良好的开端。本书还建议为民主、预算透明、冲突后的形势和投资制定宪章。

　　This idea sounds very naive. But the European Union has shown that external standards can make a big difference. Why should countries not sign up to charters of better governance in return for large quantities of aid? This is not imperialism. It is a bargain made in the interests of their own people.

　　这种观点似乎很天真。但欧盟(EU)已经证明，外部标准可以造成巨大差别。这些国家为什么不能签署关于改善治理的宪章，以换得更多援助呢？这不是帝国主义。这是为自己的人民谋福利。