2014年经济学人 阿根廷债务 别签协议啦（在线收听）

Argentina's debt

Let's not make a deal

Argentina may spurn a chance to settle with its creditors

WHEN Argentina defaulted on its debt for the second time in 13 years last July, the government blamed a pesky clause in its contracts with bondholders. The so-called Rights Upon Future Offers (RUFO) clause was set to expire on December 31st, in theory opening the way to a settlement with bondholders who had refused Argentina's earlier offers of partial payment. A deal would make it easier to borrow dollars, which the country badly needs to pay for imports. But the president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, may spurn the opportunity.

After its previous default (in 2001) Argentina offered RUFO as a way to entice bondholders to swap the old debt for new bonds worth much less than the original ones. The clause says that any future deal offered to some bondholders would be extended to all of them. In 2012 a court in New York ruled that Argentina would have to pay in full the small minority of bondholders who refused the debt swap. These are mostly American hedge funds, which bought the bonds at a fraction of their face value. Argentina argued that complying with the court order would trigger billions in payments to all holders of bonds issued under New York law, and so chose to default. Since the court's ruling, its foreign-exchange reserves have dwindled to $30 billion, less than needed to pay for six months' imports. Low commodity prices mean that few dollars are flowing in.

The government has responded by further restricting imports, which has led to shortages of supplies to factories and of some consumer goods. That is one reason why the economy is expected to shrink by around 1% in 2015. Debt payments during the year will siphon off some 40% of international reserves. In December Argentina tried to reduce that drain by offering holders of bonds due for repayment new securities that mature in 2024. The gambit failed miserably: just 4% of creditors volunteered to exchange their 2015 bonds.

Things are so desperate that the government will soon make an attractive offer to holdout bondholders, some observers believe. The expiration of the RUFO clause makes the cost bearable; the government would not have to make the same offer to the other bondholders.

But that is a minority view. The real obstacles to paying off the holdouts have always been political rather than contractual, many think. Ms Fernández and her advisers demonised them as “vultures” and blamed them for many of Argentina's woes. To pay them now would be awkward, and the economic gains might be modest. Luis Secco of Perspectivas, a consulting firm, argues that turmoil in Venezuela, Russia and other emerging markets will make investors hesitant to lend to Argentina. Even if the government reaches an agreement with creditors, “it won't rain dollars,” he says.

Besides, ask sceptics, why should Ms Fernández strike a bargain that would bring political benefits mainly to her successor? She will stand down as president after elections next October; none of the prospective candidates so far has her backing. The easiest course of action would be to hand off the debt fiasco to the next president—and let the economy pay the price.