2023年经济学人 帝国的黄昏（在线收听）

　　Another transformation was in external policy—from a militarised, expansionist Eurasian realm into a compact state that enforced internal cohesion but mostly eschewed foreign adventures.

　　另一个转变是在对外政策上--从一个军事化、扩张主义的欧亚王国，转变为一个加强内部凝聚力、但基本上避免对外冒险的紧凑型国家。

　　At least, until the past decade or so, in which President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has turned Ottoman nostalgia into a style of governance and a stimulus to military braggadocio.

　　至少在过去十年左右，总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安将对奥斯曼帝国的怀念变成了一种治理风格，刺激了军事方面的自负。

　　Informing this book is the idea that the Ottoman empire’s downfall was not predestined by backwardness, or even by defeat in a global war.

　　贯穿这本书的观点是，奥斯曼帝国的衰落并非因为落后，甚至不是因为在全球战争中的失败。

　　Nor, it suggests, did change inevitably follow the principal catalyst: Greece’s occupation (with international support) of the great multinational port of Izmir, followed by the advance into Anatolia of a Greek expeditionary force.

　　这本书还表明，在出现主要催化剂——希腊(在国际支持下)占领伟大的多国港口伊兹密尔，随后希腊远征军进入安纳托利亚——之后，变化也并非不可避免。

　　The republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal, later known as Ataturk, did draw vast authority from routing that force; but that did not automatically exorcise the Ottoman order, whose supporters still resisted change, as the book recalls.

　　这个共和国的缔造者穆斯塔法·凯末尔（后来被称为阿塔图尔克），确实通过打击那支武装力量获得了巨大的威信；但正如书中回忆的那样，这并没有自动驱散奥斯曼帝国的秩序，其支持者仍然抵制变革。

　　Arguments about the inevitability of historical developments, or their precise causes, often become circular.

　　关于历史发展的必然性或其确切原因的争论往往会变成循环论证。

　　History happened because it happened.

　　历史之所以发生，是因为它发生了。

　　What really matters is that the empire did fall.

　　真正重要的是帝国确实灭亡了。

　　Or did it?

　　真的吗？

　　By way of continuity, some historians note that the empire was itself reforming and modernising, with contested elections and enhanced rights for non-Muslims.

　　通过逻辑关联，一些历史学家指出，帝国本身也在进行改革和现代化，它举行了激烈的选举，还加强了非穆斯林的权利。

　　Others see a contrary sort of overlap in the non-liberal aspects of modern Turkey, including the power of the army and state control over religious affairs.

　　其他人则看到，现代土耳其的非自由主义方面存在相反的重叠，包括军队的权力和国家对宗教事务的控制。

　　For his part, Mr Erdogan has cultivated imperial sentiment in big and small ways (a television series set in medieval times depicts early Ottomans fighting heroically).

　　就埃尔多安而言，他从大大小小的方面培养了帝国情怀(一部以中世纪为背景的电视连续剧描绘了早期奥斯曼人英勇战斗的场面)。

　　For Mr Gingeras, this is more than mood music.

　　对金格拉斯来说，这不仅仅是在煽动情绪。

　　He is, after all, a professor of national security at a postgraduate school of the American navy; he has said that a new war between Turkey and Greece is not merely possible, but probable, in view of threats by Mr Erdogan to “come one night” and challenge Greece’s islands.

　　毕竟，他是美国海军研究生院的一名国家安全教授；他曾表示，鉴于埃尔多安威胁要“在某一天晚上到来”并挑战希腊的岛屿，土耳其和希腊之间爆发新的战争不仅是可能的，而且是很有可能的。

　　Mr Erdogan may ultimately be swayed by a contest between two competing influences: the restraining power of NATO and the desire of Russia to sow discord among its rivals.

　　埃尔多安最终可能会被两种相互竞争的影响所左右：北约的克制力量和俄罗斯在对手中挑拨离间的愿望。

　　In forecasting the outcome, the past—even when so well-chronicled—provides food for thought but no clear answers.

　　在预测结果时，即使有如此详尽的记载，过去也只能提供思考的食粮，无法提供明确的答案。

　　History has yet to end.

　　历史尚未结束。