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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
Washington
07 December 2007
For months, Bush administration officials have said Iran was actively1 pursuing a nuclear weapons program and called on collective international action, including sanctions, to force Tehran to stop. But a new U.S. intelligence report says Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, and that as of mid-2007, at least, had not restarted it. As VOA correspondent Gary Thomas reports, the public release of the estimate may alter perceptions and policies in both Washington and Tehran.
At some points, the rhetoric2 coming from Washington and Tehran was so harsh that it fueled speculation3 that the United States was planning to attack Iran.
But a new U.S. intelligence estimate on Iran's nuclear program stands in sharp contrast to earlier pronouncements by Bush administration officials that Iran is in active pursuit of nuclear weapons. The National Intelligence Estimate, which represents the collective judgment4 of the 16 U.S. agencies that deal in intelligence, says that Iran may not be as determined5 to develop nuclear weapons as the U.S. previously6 believed.
President Bush insists that the new intelligence report represents no change in U.S. policy or attitude towards Iran. If anything, he says, it should reinvigorate joint7 international efforts to keep nuclear arms knowledge out of Iran's hands.
"Our policy remains8 the same," said President Bush. "I see a danger. And many in the world see the same danger. This report is not an 'OK, everybody needs to relax and quit' report. This is a report that says what has happened in the past could be repeated and that the policies used to cause the regime to halt are effective policies, and let's keep them up. Let's continue to work together."
Vali Nasr, a senior fellow on Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, says the new National Intelligence Estimate undercuts U.S. efforts to get support for more sanctions against Iran.
"The mistake of the Bush administration was that it overreached," said Nasr. "In overstating Iran's capability9, in overstating Iran's threat, it created a house of cards that has all of a sudden fallen down."
But Larry Wilkerson, who was former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's chief of staff, says that Washington may be sending a signal to Tehran by the release of the report.
"We're releasing this National Intelligence Estimate which more or less reverses our previous appraisal10 of you as a monolithic11 entity12 that is absolutely impossible to talk to," he said. "We're actually saying it might be somewhat to our advantage to talk to you. We're actually saying you might be persuadable if we talk to you in the right way. If my optimistic side is interpreting it correctly, it's an incredibly sophisticated effort to lay down a carpet, so to speak, to eventual13 diplomacy14 and negotiations15 with Iran."
The report has upset some conservative American politicians and commentators16 who favor keeping up a hard line against Iran, including possible military action. Some Republican lawmakers have called for a commission to examine the estimate's findings.
The publicly released version is a carefully worded document that rates key points as having a high, moderate, or low degree of confidence. John McLaughlin, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, says that, having been burned by its mistakes about Iraq's alleged17 weapons of mass destruction, the intelligence community is being very careful, especially on an issue as sensitive as Iran.
"One of the things to which intelligence agencies pay particular attention these days is making clear their levels of uncertainty," said McLaughlin. "This is one of the lessons of the Iraq WMD experience. And so for the agencies to say they believe this with high confidence is very noteworthy. It tells me that they have sources who have a demonstrated track record of producing accurate information, or they would not be saying that."
Not surprisingly, the report was welcomed in Iran, where it was termed a "victory" by officials, who have consistently denied that Iran seeks nuclear weapons. But some analysts18 believe there could be some domestic political fallout in Iran for the hardline president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Vali Nasr says President Ahmadinejad has used the nuclear issue to rally political support and divert attention away from the country's continuing economic woes19 of high unemployment and inflation.
"Now, if war is off the table, it doesn't matter what Ahmadinejad says and how much bluster20 he puts out," he said. "If war is off the table, the Iranian electorate21 may pay a lot more attention to issues that don't favor Ahmadinejad in the elections. I think it might have a positive effect within Iran, ironically, of refocusing everybody on domestic issues at a time when elections are around the corner."
Iran's parliamentary elections are due in March, and the presidential election in 2009.
1 actively | |
adv.积极地,勤奋地 | |
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2 rhetoric | |
n.修辞学,浮夸之言语 | |
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3 speculation | |
n.思索,沉思;猜测;投机 | |
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4 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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5 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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6 previously | |
adv.以前,先前(地) | |
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7 joint | |
adj.联合的,共同的;n.关节,接合处;v.连接,贴合 | |
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8 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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9 capability | |
n.能力;才能;(pl)可发展的能力或特性等 | |
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10 appraisal | |
n.对…作出的评价;评价,鉴定,评估 | |
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11 monolithic | |
adj.似独块巨石的;整体的 | |
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12 entity | |
n.实体,独立存在体,实际存在物 | |
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13 eventual | |
adj.最后的,结局的,最终的 | |
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14 diplomacy | |
n.外交;外交手腕,交际手腕 | |
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15 negotiations | |
协商( negotiation的名词复数 ); 谈判; 完成(难事); 通过 | |
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16 commentators | |
n.评论员( commentator的名词复数 );时事评论员;注释者;实况广播员 | |
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17 alleged | |
a.被指控的,嫌疑的 | |
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18 analysts | |
分析家,化验员( analyst的名词复数 ) | |
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19 woes | |
困境( woe的名词复数 ); 悲伤; 我好苦哇; 某人就要倒霉 | |
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20 bluster | |
v.猛刮;怒冲冲的说;n.吓唬,怒号;狂风声 | |
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21 electorate | |
n.全体选民;选区 | |
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