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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
The director of the Central Intelligence Agency recently set off a new controversy1 when reports emerged that he had ordered an embryonic2 secret counter-terrorism program terminated. Members of Congress were outraged3, claiming they had never been informed of the program's existence. The relationship between America's spies and its lawmakers has been contentious4 for decades.
CIA Director Leon Panetta (file photo)
Besides enacting5 laws, one of the Congress' key duties is to monitor the programs and actions of government departments, and the trickiest6 is oversight7 of intelligence agencies, most particularly the Central Intelligence Agency.
Amy Zegart, who teaches on intelligence matters at the University of California in Los Angeles, says oversight of the U.S. spy world is about both efficiency and ethics8.
"There is an efficacy argument to congressional oversight, that having someone outside of these agencies asking hard questions, demanding results, examining performance, makes our intelligence agencies operate better," she said.
"But there is also an ethical9 part of the equation, which is that in a democratic society we need to have democratically elected members of Congress overseeing these secret, cloistered10 intelligence agencies to make sure that we are protecting American values and civil liberties," she added.
Need for oversight
The need for oversight often clashes with the spies' natural need for secrecy11 and their fear of leaks of sensitive information. But such charges are a deep affront12 to members of Congress, who insist the intelligence committees are secure and do not leak information.
Most democratic countries do have some form of oversight over their intelligence agencies. Former U.S. intelligence officer Bob Ayers, now a security consultant13 in Britain, says Europeans tend to be more tolerant of secrecy than Americans.
"Within the United Kingdom - as an example in Europe - intelligence operations are secret," he said. "They are designed to be secret. Nobody knows, nobody talks, and nobody worries about whether or not nobody talks."
But what makes the United States unique, say analysts14, is the legal requirement the president and the agencies, particularly the CIA, inform congressional intelligence committees of intelligence operations in a "timely manner".
When the CIA was founded in 1947, the Cold War was starting to pick up steam and the CIA had virtually a free hand. Oversight was informal and minimal15, with no laws on the books about it. But Villanova University professor David Barrett, who has written a book on CIA-congressional relations, points out that even in those freewheeling days there was recognition that some form of oversight was needed.
"They may not have liked it, but there was always a recognition on the part of CIA leaders - and grudging16 recognition by presidents, even back in the early Cold War - that to some degree, at least a few members of Congress had a right to know about sensitive operations of the CIA - not the whole Congress, but some small number, small number of members of Congress," he said.
Oversight evolved for a simple, pragmatic reason: Congress holds the purse strings17. If the CIA and its sister agencies wanted funding, they had to let at least some senior appropriations18 committee members in on a few secrets. The rest of Congress often voted on intelligence budgetary authorizations with no idea what they were funding.
Change of attitudes
Public and congressional attitudes acceptance of the spies' traditional secrecy changed sharply in the 1970s with the Watergate scandal and then revelations of questionable19 activities by the CIA and the National Security Agency. Those included domestic spying, planned assassinations20 of foreign leaders, drug testing on unsuspecting subjects, and other abuses. There were investigations21 in the House and Senate, which led to the creation of permanent intelligence committees in each chamber22.
Today there are numerous laws on intelligence oversight. The president is supposed to inform the intelligence committees of intelligence operations, although disclosure of sensitive information can be limited to eight senior senators and House members. It should be noted23 that the requirement is to inform of those operations, not to seek approval for them.
But as David Barrett points out, charges periodically arise in nearly every administration that information has been illegally concealed24 from members of Congress.
"The really sort of interesting, and in some ways shocking, thing is that despite all these laws that have been passed, there is still a very difficult problem of intelligence oversight by Congress when the White House and/or certain intelligence leaders decide not to share that information, and then make claims that it is legal not to share that information," he said.
The Bush administration was accused of withholding25 information on some intelligence programs, such as an electronic eavesdropping26 program. CIA Director Leon Panetta is quoted as telling the Senate Intelligence Committee in closed-door session that Vice-President Dick Cheney ordered the CIA not to tell Congress of the counterterrorism program that Panetta terminated.
But analysts say that is a gray area because the program, which is reported to have targeted al-Qaida leaders back in 2001, never got off the drawing board and may not have been subject to congressional reporting requirements.
1 controversy | |
n.争论,辩论,争吵 | |
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2 embryonic | |
adj.胚胎的 | |
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3 outraged | |
a.震惊的,义愤填膺的 | |
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4 contentious | |
adj.好辩的,善争吵的 | |
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5 enacting | |
制定(法律),通过(法案)( enact的现在分词 ) | |
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6 trickiest | |
adj.狡猾的( tricky的最高级 );(形势、工作等)复杂的;机警的;微妙的 | |
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7 oversight | |
n.勘漏,失察,疏忽 | |
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8 ethics | |
n.伦理学;伦理观,道德标准 | |
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9 ethical | |
adj.伦理的,道德的,合乎道德的 | |
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10 cloistered | |
adj.隐居的,躲开尘世纷争的v.隐退,使与世隔绝( cloister的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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11 secrecy | |
n.秘密,保密,隐蔽 | |
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12 affront | |
n./v.侮辱,触怒 | |
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13 consultant | |
n.顾问;会诊医师,专科医生 | |
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14 analysts | |
分析家,化验员( analyst的名词复数 ) | |
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15 minimal | |
adj.尽可能少的,最小的 | |
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16 grudging | |
adj.勉强的,吝啬的 | |
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17 strings | |
n.弦 | |
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18 appropriations | |
n.挪用(appropriation的复数形式) | |
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19 questionable | |
adj.可疑的,有问题的 | |
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20 assassinations | |
n.暗杀( assassination的名词复数 ) | |
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21 investigations | |
(正式的)调查( investigation的名词复数 ); 侦查; 科学研究; 学术研究 | |
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22 chamber | |
n.房间,寝室;会议厅;议院;会所 | |
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23 noted | |
adj.著名的,知名的 | |
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24 concealed | |
a.隐藏的,隐蔽的 | |
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25 withholding | |
扣缴税款 | |
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26 eavesdropping | |
n. 偷听 | |
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