改革中国的国有企业

　　From SOE to GLC

　　从国有企业到国联企业

　　China’s rulers look to Singapore for tips on portfolio management

　　中国领导人指望得到新加坡关于投资组合管理的指点

　　Nov 23rd 2013 | HONG KONG |From the print edition

　　SHORTLY before his confirmation as China’s “paramount leader” in 1978, Deng Xiaoping paid a visit to fast-growing Singapore. He planted a tree on a hill overlooking Jurong, a bustling industrial park built on what was once marshy wasteland close to the city-state’s harbour. Singapore’s success as a trading hub impressed Deng, who imposed his vision of economic reform on China’s Communist Party the following month, at an historic meeting known as the “third plenum”.

　　1978年，邓小平被任命为中国“最高领导人”前夕，他对高速发展的新加坡进行了访问。他在俯瞰裕廊的一座山上种植了一棵树，裕廊是建于城市港口附近的一个蓬勃发展的工业园区，那里曾经是一个不毛之地。新加坡成功成为一个贸易枢纽给邓小平留下了深刻的印象，他在访问新加坡后的一个月，在那个具有历史意义的“三中全会”上，向中国共产党提出了有关经济改革的设想。

　　Singapore, which has a population of 5m to China’s 1.35 billion, remains a source of inspiration for some Chinese reformers. On the eve of the latest third plenum, held earlier this month, the Development Research Centre (DRC), a government think-tank, advertised an ambitious set of reform proposals, including an overhaul of China’s inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Simply privatising these companies remains out of the question for China’s leaders. But there are alternatives, and Singapore provides one.

　　对于中国一些改革家来说，拥有500万人口的新加坡与拥有13.5亿人口的中国相比，仍然具有激励作用。本月初期举行的十八届三中全会前夕，政府智囊团国务院发展研究中心公布了一系列雄心勃勃的改革提议，包括彻底改革中国低效国有企业。仅仅将这些企业私有化对中国领导人来说是不可能的。但是他们还有其他选择，新加坡就提供了一个选项。

　　The DRC’s plan named Temasek, a holding company for SOEs in Singapore, as a potential model. It was created in 1974, when it inherited 35 companies from the finance ministry. Its inaugural portfolio contained several of the firms that made Jurong eye-catching, including its shipyard and its birdpark (pictured). In the four decades since, Temasek’s portfolio has both multiplied (it is now worth S$215 billion, or $172 billion) and gone forth: only 30% of its holdings remain in Singapore itself. Its domestic holdings are concentrated in what Singapore calls “government-linked companies” (GLCs), such as Singapore Airlines (of which it owns 56%) and SingTel, a telecoms company (52%).

　　国务院发展研究中心计划把新加坡国有企业控股公司淡马锡公司作为一个可能的模型。淡马锡公司成立于1974年，它从新加坡财政部手中接手了35家国有企业。它成立的投资组合包括几个使得裕廊引人注目的公司，包括其造船厂和飞禽公园（如图）。从那时起后四十年，裕廊的投资组合不仅迅速增加（它现在价值2150亿新加坡币，约合1720亿美元），还不断发展：只有30%的控股还在新加坡手上。其国内股份集中在新加坡称为“国联企业”手中，例如新加坡航空（控股56%），电信公司SingTel（52%）。

　　Temasek’s charter obliges it to increase the value of its holdings over the long term. This is a remarkably simple aim compared with the Chinese government’s manifold ambitions. It wants its holdings to promote technological progress, favoured industries and national security, among other things.

　　淡马锡公司的章程迫使他们在长期增加他们股份的价值。这相对于中国政府各种各样的雄心壮志来说明显是一个简单明确的目标。此外，他们还希望他们的股份能推进技术进步，推动中意的工业发展和国家安全。

　　As well as clarifying objectives, the Temasek model also allows the state to distance itself from the management of its enterprises, without relinquishing ownership. Temasek avoids meddling in the day-to-day running of the GLCs in its portfolio, which are free to hire professional managers at market rates. With a few exceptions, it does not directly appoint board members either. This is partly because it does not want to become privy to price-sensitive information that might limit its ability to trade shares.

　　除了阐明目标以外，淡马锡模型还准许国家在不放弃所有权的情况下，拉开自己与企业管理的距离。淡马锡模型避免了对国联企业投资组合日常管理的干预，这样可以随意以市场价雇佣专业的管理人才。除了几个例外，淡马锡公司也不直接任命董事会成员。这样做部分原因是因为它不想获准接触那些可能会限制其自身交易股份能力的价格敏感的信息。

　　Temasek has evolved into an active investor, but not an activist one, says Stephen Forshaw, its chief spokesman. Although it does not appoint directors, it does meet regularly with its wards’ boards to make its feelings known. It also keeps managers on their toes by enlisting outside consultants, such as Bain or McKinsey, to spot industrial trends they should be aware of.

　　淡马锡公司首席发言人史蒂芬福肖说，淡马锡公司已经逐步发展成了一个活跃的投资者，但不是一个积极分子。虽然淡马锡不任命董事，它定期与其监管董事会开会，让董事会知道他们的想法。它还让管理者通过谋求外部咨询来保持警觉，如向贝恩或麦肯锡咨询，来留意他们应该知道的工业发展趋势。

　　Would the Temasek model help improve the efficiency of China’s state-owned enterprises? Only one (Singapore Airlines) or possibly two (DBS bank) of Temasek’s GLCs have established themselves as international brands, according to critics such as Chris Balding of Peking University. SingTel has made successful foreign acquisitions, but other GLCs have fared less well. STATS ChipPAC, a semiconductor firm, lost money in the second quarter of this year, as a result of the costs of closing a factory in Malaysia.

　　淡马锡模型会有助于提高中国国有企业的效率吗？据北京大学的克里斯鲍尔丁说，淡马锡公司的国联企业中只有一个（新加坡航空）或者可能两个（DBS银行）已经成为了国际品牌。SingTel成功进行了外资并购，但是其他国联企业很少有成功的。半导体公司STATAS ChipPAC今年第二季度亏损，因为它关闭了位于马来西亚的一个工厂。

　　The few academic studies of Singapore’s GLCs are more encouraging, however. A 2004 article by Carlos Ramirez of George Mason University and Ling Hui Tan of the IMF showed that the country’s GLCs enjoyed a higher market value, relative to the book value of their assets, than comparable private firms. They also generated a higher return on assets, on average.

　　但是关于新加坡国联企业的学术研究越少越令人鼓舞。乔治梅森的卡洛斯拉米雷斯和国际货币基金组织的Ling Hui Tan 2004发表的一篇文章表明，就资产净值而言，新加坡的国联企业比起私人企业有更高的市场价值。他们还创造更高的平均投资回报。

　　In judging the performance of Temasek’s GLCs, the counterfactual is important. They may not be as obviously successful as private titans from the region such as Samsung or LG. But they are not nearly as bad as most SOEs, including China’s. The enthusiasm for reform of SOEs in China reflects their deteriorating returns and accumulating debt. According to M.K. Tang of Goldman Sachs, their return on assets was 6.5 percentage points below that of other Chinese firms in 2012 and their shares trade at a growing discount. Even Mr Balding, meanwhile, is happy to fly Singapore Airlines.

　　在评价淡马锡的国联企业的表现时，反事实的情况很重要。他们可能不会像亚洲私人公司巨头那样有着明显的成功，如三星、LG。但是他们几乎不会像大多数国有企业包括中国的国有企业那样糟糕。中国国有企业改革的激情反映了他们日益恶化的投资回报和日益增长的债务。根据高盛投资公司的M.K. Tang，2012年国有企业的资产回报比中国其他公司低6.5个百分点，且他们的股份持续贬值。同时，甚至是鲍尔丁先生也很高兴乘坐新加坡航空。