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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
Cartel-busting
Boring can still be bad
Market-rigging in unsexy industries costs consumers a lot. More can be done to detect and deter1 it.
MENTION price cartels and many people will think of big, overt2 ones like the one OPEC runs for oil and the now-extinct one for diamonds.
But at least as damaging are the many secret cartels in such unglamorous areas as ball-bearings and cargo3 rates,
which go on unnoticed for years, quietly bumping up the end cost to consumers of all manner of goods and services.
Collusion among producers to rig prices and carve up markets is thriving, with the cartels growing ever more intricate and global in scope.
Competition authorities have uncovered several whopping conspiracies4 in recent years,
including one in which more than 20 airlines worldwide had fixed5 prices on perhaps 20 billion of freight shipments.
They were fined a total of 3 billion; and so far the compensation claims from ripped-off customers comfortably exceed 1 billion.
One academic study found that the typical cartel raised the price of the goods or services in question by 20%.
Another suggested that cartels were robbing poor countries'consumers of tens of billions of dollars a year:
if so, negating6 all the aid that rich countries'governments send them.
Investigators7 are still unravelling8 a huge global network of cartels among suppliers of a wide range of car parts.
Makers9 of seat belts, radiators10 and foam11 seat-stuffing have had hefty fines slapped on them.
Earlier this month the European Commission fined five makers of automotive bearings a total of 953m (1.32 billion).
This week its investigators raided a bunch of makers of car exhausts.
Also in recent days, Brazilian prosecutors12 have charged executives from a dozen foreign train-makers accused of rigging bids for rail and subway contracts in the country's main cities.
Price-fixing has infected high finance, too. Some of banking's biggest names stand accused of fiddling13 interest-rate and foreign-exchange benchmarks.
The good news is that enforcement has got tougher, smarter and more co-ordinated. Gone are the days when price-fixers got a slap on the wrist.
Firms can expect swingeing fines, and bosses can go to jail. Since many cartels now operate across borders, so do investigators:
American and Japanese trustbusters joined forces to flush out the car-parts cartels. And incentives14 for whistleblowers have also increased:
around 50 countries now offer immunity15 or reduced penalties for snitches.
That is all for the better, but the penalties for price-fixing remain too mild. The best study of the issue so far concluded that,
given the still-low risk of detection, collusion pays. Yet beyond a certain point—
which the fines now imposed by American and European regulators have probably reached—
fines inflict16 so much damage on guilty companies that they undermine competition instead of enhancing it.
The answer is stiffer prison sentences, particularly for senior executives.
American courts, only too ready to lock up other types of miscreants17 for a long time,
have rarely jailed egregious18 price-fixers for anything like the maximum of ten years that the law allows.
Other countries have even more scope to increase sentences.
Buy some geeks
More can be done to aid detection, too. Statistical19 tests to “screen” markets for unusual pricing patterns helped uncover the interest-rate and foreign-exchange scandals.
Potential conspirators20 may think twice if they suspect their market is being screened. European and Latin American trustbusters are making good use of the technique;
their American counterparts should do so, too. Deploying21 such cutting-edge technology is costly22;
and increased funding is a big ask at a time of public-sector parsimony23.
But cartel authorities in Europe and America generally bring in far more than they cost to run, so extra money pushed in their direction is likely to be well spent.
Another way to discourage the formation of cartels is to factor the increased risk of collusion into scrutiny24 of proposed mergers25.
Price-fixing is likelier, and easier to sustain, with fewer players. This could never be the primary determinant in competition decisions,
but it should be in the mix. Blocking a few more mergers—whose benefits anyway tend to be over-egged—
might both save companies from themselves and spare their customers the costs of collusion.
1 deter | |
vt.阻止,使不敢,吓住 | |
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2 overt | |
adj.公开的,明显的,公然的 | |
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3 cargo | |
n.(一只船或一架飞机运载的)货物 | |
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4 conspiracies | |
n.阴谋,密谋( conspiracy的名词复数 ) | |
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5 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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6 negating | |
v.取消( negate的现在分词 );使无效;否定;否认 | |
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7 investigators | |
n.调查者,审查者( investigator的名词复数 ) | |
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8 unravelling | |
解开,拆散,散开( unravel的现在分词 ); 阐明; 澄清; 弄清楚 | |
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9 makers | |
n.制造者,制造商(maker的复数形式) | |
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10 radiators | |
n.(暖气设备的)散热器( radiator的名词复数 );汽车引擎的冷却器,散热器 | |
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11 foam | |
v./n.泡沫,起泡沫 | |
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12 prosecutors | |
检举人( prosecutor的名词复数 ); 告发人; 起诉人; 公诉人 | |
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13 fiddling | |
微小的 | |
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14 incentives | |
激励某人做某事的事物( incentive的名词复数 ); 刺激; 诱因; 动机 | |
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15 immunity | |
n.优惠;免除;豁免,豁免权 | |
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16 inflict | |
vt.(on)把…强加给,使遭受,使承担 | |
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17 miscreants | |
n.恶棍,歹徒( miscreant的名词复数 ) | |
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18 egregious | |
adj.非常的,过分的 | |
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19 statistical | |
adj.统计的,统计学的 | |
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20 conspirators | |
n.共谋者,阴谋家( conspirator的名词复数 ) | |
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21 deploying | |
(尤指军事行动)使展开( deploy的现在分词 ); 施展; 部署; 有效地利用 | |
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22 costly | |
adj.昂贵的,价值高的,豪华的 | |
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23 parsimony | |
n.过度节俭,吝啬 | |
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24 scrutiny | |
n.详细检查,仔细观察 | |
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25 mergers | |
n.(两个公司的)合并( merger的名词复数 ) | |
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