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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
Those aggressive drivers or dreadful waiters you meet may not be terrible people after all, says Harvard economist1 Edward Glaeser. He believes we should presume more decency2 in our fellow humans
Welcome to This I Believe -- an NPR series presenting the personal philosophies of remarkable3 men and women from all walks of life.
I believe in mystery
I believe in family.
I believe in being who I am.
I believe in the power of failure.
And I believe normal life is extraordinary.
This I believe. I'm Jay Allison for This I Believe. Edward Glaeser is a professor of economics at Harvard. His work has included research on political extremism and how hatred4 arises among different groups particularly hatred which has little basis in truth. He says that economists5 don't tend to think of themselves as moral arbiters6, and in fact it is in the reticence7 about judging others that he finds his belief. Here's Edward Glaeser with his essay for This I Believe.
I believe in the presumption8 of decency.
While I like to think of myself as being as rational as an economist should be, I can get a little miffed at minor9 offenses10 that somehow appear to me, momentarily, as great villainy. In some of my more embarrassing moments, I've come to see law-abiding and therefore slow cab drivers as violators of the basic standards of taxicab decency, which, in my haste, I have convinced myself demand utterly12 breakneck speed.
While my retribution may be limited to cutting their tips from 15 percent to 13.25 percent, I have then spent the next hour furious at the cab driver, his dispatcher, his country of origin, and pretty much anything else in my way. Sadly, I have also privately13 vilified14 editors who have rejected my research, restaurants that haven't taken my reservations and even politicians who have had the audacity15 to push policies that I oppose. This is the type of folly16 that can be avoided with the presumption of decency.
Academics can be a little arrogant17, and I am certainly among those who are quite comfortable thinking that I am right and that someone else is wrong. But it is one thing to think that someone else is misled and another to think that they are evil. We don't hate the merely annoying or the purely18 pathetic. Hatred starts by believing someone to be a villain11 without decency. And hatred is a pretty good emotion to avoid. It is personally painful to hate. Hatred clouds our judgment19 and can lead us to make spiteful decisions that do no one any good.
There is a personal value — the presumption of decency — that counteracts20 the tendency to let hatred befuddle21 our reason. If we hold tightly to the view that people around us are as decent as ourselves, trying, like us, to muddle22 honorably through life, it is harder to turn them into villains23 and to turn ourselves into creatures of irrational24 judgment. Besides, I'm certainly no more decent than most of mankind.
The presumption of decency is not naiveté. Instead, it requires a certain amount of realism. If you expect perfection, you will spend your days being furious at irresponsible teenage babysitters and equally irresponsible politicians. A better approach is to recognize human frailty25 and to be generous in our judgments26. Today's political dialogues could particularly benefit from the recognition that both parties are led by imperfect but not terrible people, whose mistaken policies are more often the result of error than evil.
I don't always succeed in presuming the decency of others, but I do my best. Like most people, I'm pretty flawed but trying to be decent, and I'm trying to believe the same about others.
Edward Glaeser, with his essay for This I Believe. Glaeser said he began thinking about this essay last year after the death of his father, who lived in Nazi27 Germany and was exposed to evil in its most extreme forms, and yet even after that Glaeser says his father had the mature wisdom to be moderate in his moral judgments about other individuals. We welcome essays from everyone for our series at npr.org/thisibelieve. You can find out more see all the essays we've aired and that have been submitted. For This I Believe. I'm Jay Allison.
This I Believe is independently produced by Jay Allison, Dan Gediman,John Gregory and Vicki Merrick with Emily Botein.
Support for NPR comes from Prudential Retirement28, sponsor of This I Believe. Prudential believes every worker can achieve a more secure retirement. Prudential Retirement, where beliefs matter.
Support for This I Believe comes from the Cooperation for Public Broadcasting.
This I Believe is produced for NPR by This I Believe Incorporated Atlantic Public Media. For more essays in the series, please visit npr.org/thisibelieve.
Welcome to This I Believe -- an NPR series presenting the personal philosophies of remarkable3 men and women from all walks of life.
I believe in mystery
I believe in family.
I believe in being who I am.
I believe in the power of failure.
And I believe normal life is extraordinary.
This I believe. I'm Jay Allison for This I Believe. Edward Glaeser is a professor of economics at Harvard. His work has included research on political extremism and how hatred4 arises among different groups particularly hatred which has little basis in truth. He says that economists5 don't tend to think of themselves as moral arbiters6, and in fact it is in the reticence7 about judging others that he finds his belief. Here's Edward Glaeser with his essay for This I Believe.
I believe in the presumption8 of decency.
While I like to think of myself as being as rational as an economist should be, I can get a little miffed at minor9 offenses10 that somehow appear to me, momentarily, as great villainy. In some of my more embarrassing moments, I've come to see law-abiding and therefore slow cab drivers as violators of the basic standards of taxicab decency, which, in my haste, I have convinced myself demand utterly12 breakneck speed.
While my retribution may be limited to cutting their tips from 15 percent to 13.25 percent, I have then spent the next hour furious at the cab driver, his dispatcher, his country of origin, and pretty much anything else in my way. Sadly, I have also privately13 vilified14 editors who have rejected my research, restaurants that haven't taken my reservations and even politicians who have had the audacity15 to push policies that I oppose. This is the type of folly16 that can be avoided with the presumption of decency.
Academics can be a little arrogant17, and I am certainly among those who are quite comfortable thinking that I am right and that someone else is wrong. But it is one thing to think that someone else is misled and another to think that they are evil. We don't hate the merely annoying or the purely18 pathetic. Hatred starts by believing someone to be a villain11 without decency. And hatred is a pretty good emotion to avoid. It is personally painful to hate. Hatred clouds our judgment19 and can lead us to make spiteful decisions that do no one any good.
There is a personal value — the presumption of decency — that counteracts20 the tendency to let hatred befuddle21 our reason. If we hold tightly to the view that people around us are as decent as ourselves, trying, like us, to muddle22 honorably through life, it is harder to turn them into villains23 and to turn ourselves into creatures of irrational24 judgment. Besides, I'm certainly no more decent than most of mankind.
The presumption of decency is not naiveté. Instead, it requires a certain amount of realism. If you expect perfection, you will spend your days being furious at irresponsible teenage babysitters and equally irresponsible politicians. A better approach is to recognize human frailty25 and to be generous in our judgments26. Today's political dialogues could particularly benefit from the recognition that both parties are led by imperfect but not terrible people, whose mistaken policies are more often the result of error than evil.
I don't always succeed in presuming the decency of others, but I do my best. Like most people, I'm pretty flawed but trying to be decent, and I'm trying to believe the same about others.
Edward Glaeser, with his essay for This I Believe. Glaeser said he began thinking about this essay last year after the death of his father, who lived in Nazi27 Germany and was exposed to evil in its most extreme forms, and yet even after that Glaeser says his father had the mature wisdom to be moderate in his moral judgments about other individuals. We welcome essays from everyone for our series at npr.org/thisibelieve. You can find out more see all the essays we've aired and that have been submitted. For This I Believe. I'm Jay Allison.
This I Believe is independently produced by Jay Allison, Dan Gediman,John Gregory and Vicki Merrick with Emily Botein.
Support for NPR comes from Prudential Retirement28, sponsor of This I Believe. Prudential believes every worker can achieve a more secure retirement. Prudential Retirement, where beliefs matter.
Support for This I Believe comes from the Cooperation for Public Broadcasting.
This I Believe is produced for NPR by This I Believe Incorporated Atlantic Public Media. For more essays in the series, please visit npr.org/thisibelieve.
点击收听单词发音
1 economist | |
n.经济学家,经济专家,节俭的人 | |
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2 decency | |
n.体面,得体,合宜,正派,庄重 | |
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3 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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4 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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5 economists | |
n.经济学家,经济专家( economist的名词复数 ) | |
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6 arbiters | |
仲裁人,裁决者( arbiter的名词复数 ) | |
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7 reticence | |
n.沉默,含蓄 | |
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8 presumption | |
n.推测,可能性,冒昧,放肆,[法律]推定 | |
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9 minor | |
adj.较小(少)的,较次要的;n.辅修学科;vi.辅修 | |
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10 offenses | |
n.进攻( offense的名词复数 );(球队的)前锋;进攻方法;攻势 | |
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11 villain | |
n.反派演员,反面人物;恶棍;问题的起因 | |
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12 utterly | |
adv.完全地,绝对地 | |
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13 privately | |
adv.以私人的身份,悄悄地,私下地 | |
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14 vilified | |
v.中伤,诽谤( vilify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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15 audacity | |
n.大胆,卤莽,无礼 | |
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16 folly | |
n.愚笨,愚蠢,蠢事,蠢行,傻话 | |
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17 arrogant | |
adj.傲慢的,自大的 | |
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18 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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19 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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20 counteracts | |
对抗,抵消( counteract的第三人称单数 ) | |
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21 befuddle | |
v.使混乱 | |
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22 muddle | |
n.困惑,混浊状态;vt.使混乱,使糊涂,使惊呆;vi.胡乱应付,混乱 | |
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23 villains | |
n.恶棍( villain的名词复数 );罪犯;(小说、戏剧等中的)反面人物;淘气鬼 | |
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24 irrational | |
adj.无理性的,失去理性的 | |
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25 frailty | |
n.脆弱;意志薄弱 | |
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26 judgments | |
判断( judgment的名词复数 ); 鉴定; 评价; 审判 | |
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27 Nazi | |
n.纳粹分子,adj.纳粹党的,纳粹的 | |
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28 retirement | |
n.退休,退职 | |
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