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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
Richard M. Nixon: "The Great Silent Majority"
"So tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency1 to end the war in a way that we could win the peace."
[AUTHENTICITY CERTIFIED2: Text version below transcribed3 directly from audio.]
Good evening, my fellow Americans.
Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam.
I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding4 issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.
Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.
How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?
How has this administration changed the policy of the previous Administration?
What has really happened in the negotiations6 in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam?
What choices do we have if we are to end the war?
What are the prospects7 for peace?
Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20: The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was beyond [behind] schedule. Five hundred and forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth8 a comprehensive peace proposal.
The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad.
In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate9 withdrawal10 of all American forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor11 was in office. I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him -- and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war.
But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world.
Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war. The great question is: How can we win America’s peace?
Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet12 Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating13 and supporting a revolution.
In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers14. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.
Now many believe that President Johnson’s decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.
But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?
In January I could only conclude that the precipitate15 withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.
For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably16 allow the Communists to repeat the massacres17 which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor18 camps.
We saw a prelude19 of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue20 last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody21 reign22 of terror in which 3,000 civilians23 were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.
With the sudden collapse24 of our support, these atrocities25 at Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.
For the United States this first defeat in our nation’s history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world.
Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.
In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence26 and clarity said,
"We want to see a stable Government there," carrying on the [a] struggle to maintain its national independence." We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia. So we’re going to stay there."¹
President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.
For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation27 in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of worlds conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace -- in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war.
For these reasons I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war fought on many fronts. I initiated28 a pursuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.
We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have proposed a cease fire under international supervision29. We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon government has pledged to accept the result of the election.
We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we’re willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future.
At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodge30 has demonstrated our flexibility31 and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional32 acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally33 and that we overthrow34 the government of South Vietnam as we leave.
We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums36 and public statements. I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum35. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.
Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented37 step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we undertook privately38 and secretly because we thought we thereby39 might open a door which publicly would be closed.
I did not wait for my inauguration40 to begin my quest for peace. Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi’s replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations. Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist41 their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.
None of these initiatives have to date produced results. In mid-July I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock42 in the Paris talks. I spoke43 directly in this office, where I’m now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive44 progress toward bringing the war to an end.
Let me read from that letter to you now:
“Dear Mr. President:
I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf45 of four years of war. But precisely46 because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of Vietnam. The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic47 war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings48 of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture49 both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war."
I received Ho Chi Minh’s reply on August 30, three days before his death. It simply reiterated50 the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press.
In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam’s chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions. And we have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications which may still prove to be productive.
But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office on January 20th, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.
Well, now, who’s at fault? It’s become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. The obstacle is the other side’s absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession51, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.
There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation5 depends only on Hanoi ’s deciding to negotiate -- to negotiate seriously. I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth -- the bad news as well as the good news -- where the lives of our young men are involved.
Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiations. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace -- a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with the major shift in U. S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly52 explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine53 -- a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.
We Americans are a do-it-yourself people -- we’re an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy. In Korea, and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression54.
Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: “When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them.”
Well in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia. First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied55 with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense56.
After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.
The defense of freedom is everybody’s business -- not just America’s business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous Administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this Administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.
The policy of the previous Administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significant did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.
The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird’s visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces. In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams’s orders, so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 per cent.
And now we have begun to see the results of this long-overdue change in American policy in Vietnam. After five years of Americans going into Vietnam we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15 over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn57 from South Vietnam, including 20 percent of all of our combat forces. The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result, they've been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.
Two other significant developments have occurred since this Administration took office. Enemy infiltration58, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack over the last three months, is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year. And most important, United States casualties have declined during the last two months to the lowest point in three years.
Let me now turn to our program for the future. We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces and their replacement59 by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.
I have not, and do not, intend to announce the timetable for our program, and there are obvious reasons for this decision which I’m sure you will understand. As I’ve indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts. One of these is the progress which can be, or might be, made in the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed60 timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive61 for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.
The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June.
Now this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable. We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time, rather than on estimates that are no longer valid62. Along with this optimistic estimate, I must in all candor63 leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.
However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point. At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam, they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam.
I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program. We have noted64 the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially65 on those factors. If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy. Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage.
If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes66 our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation. This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy which as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces I am making and meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.
My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war. I can order an immediate precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action. Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement, if possible, or through continued implementation67 of our plan for Vietnamization, if necessary -- a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.
I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way. It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace, not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.
In speaking of the consequences of a precipitous withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America. Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable68 remorse69 and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.
We have faced other crises in our history and we have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what has to be done when we knew our course was right. I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic70 Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved. In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading, “Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home.” Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view.
But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this nation to be dictated71 by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the nation by mounting demonstrations72 in the street. For almost 200 years, the policy of this nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all the people. If a vocal73 minority, however fervent74 its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this nation has no future as a free society.
And now, I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war. I respect your idealism. I share your concern for peace. I want peace as much as you do. There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It's very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.
I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam. But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam some place in the world.
And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication75 of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred76 against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.
I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed. If it does not succeed, what the critics say now won’t matter. Or if it does succeed, what the critics say now won’t matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won’t matter.
I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism77 or national destiny these days, but I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion. Two hundred years ago this nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world, and the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined78 by whether the American people have the moral stamina79 and the courage to meet the challenge of free-world leadership.
Let historians not record that, when America was the most powerful nation in the world, we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated80 by the forces of totalitarianism.
So tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge. The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed81. For the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.
Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand -- North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate82 the United States. Only Americans can do that.
Fifty years ago, in this room, and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: “This is the war to end wars.” His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard reality of great power politics. And Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.
Tonight, I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars, but I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which -- to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated83 -- the goal of a just and lasting84 peace.
As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path for that goal and then leading the nation along it.
I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command, in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.
Thank you and good night.
收听单词发音 |
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presidency
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| n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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certified
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| a.经证明合格的；具有证明文件的 | |
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transcribed
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| （用不同的录音手段）转录( transcribe的过去式和过去分词 )； 改编（乐曲）（以适应他种乐器或声部）； 抄写； 用音标标出（声音） | |
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overriding
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| a.最主要的 | |
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negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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prospects
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| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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predecessor
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| n.前辈，前任 | |
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Soviet
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| adj.苏联的，苏维埃的；n.苏维埃 | |
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instigating
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| v.使（某事物）开始或发生，鼓动( instigate的现在分词 ) | |
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advisers
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| 顾问，劝告者( adviser的名词复数 )； （指导大学新生学科问题等的）指导教授 | |
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precipitate
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| adj.突如其来的；vt.使突然发生；n.沉淀物 | |
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inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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massacres
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| 大屠杀( massacre的名词复数 )； 惨败 | |
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labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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prelude
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| n.序言，前兆，序曲 | |
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hue
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| n.色度；色调；样子 | |
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bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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civilians
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| 平民，百姓( civilian的名词复数 )； 老百姓 | |
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collapse
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| vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷 | |
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atrocities
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| n.邪恶，暴行( atrocity的名词复数 )；滔天大罪 | |
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eloquence
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| n.雄辩；口才，修辞 | |
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humiliation
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| n.羞辱 | |
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initiated
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| n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始，创始，启蒙，介绍加入 | |
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supervision
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| n.监督，管理 | |
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lodge
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| v.临时住宿，寄宿，寄存，容纳；n.传达室，小旅馆 | |
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flexibility
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| n.柔韧性，弹性，（光的）折射性，灵活性 | |
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unconditional
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| adj.无条件的，无限制的，绝对的 | |
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unconditionally
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| adv.无条件地 | |
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overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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forum
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| n.论坛，讨论会 | |
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forums
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| 讨论会； 座谈会； 广播专题讲话节目； 集会的公共场所( forum的名词复数 )； 论坛，讨论会，专题讨论节目； 法庭 | |
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unprecedented
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| adj.无前例的，新奇的 | |
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privately
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| adv.以私人的身份，悄悄地，私下地 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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inauguration
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| n.开幕、就职典礼 | |
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enlist
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| vt.谋取(支持等)，赢得；征募；vi.入伍 | |
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42
deadlock
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| n.僵局，僵持 | |
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43
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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constructive
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| adj.建设的，建设性的 | |
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gulf
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| n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂 | |
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46
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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tragic
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| adj.悲剧的，悲剧性的，悲惨的 | |
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48
blessings
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| n.（上帝的）祝福( blessing的名词复数 )；好事；福分；因祸得福 | |
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49
juncture
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| n.时刻，关键时刻，紧要关头 | |
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50
reiterated
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| 反复地说，重申( reiterate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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51
concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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52
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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53
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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54
aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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55
allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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56
defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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57
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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58
infiltration
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| n.渗透；下渗；渗滤；入渗 | |
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59
replacement
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| n.取代，替换，交换；替代品，代用品 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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incentive
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| n.刺激；动力；鼓励；诱因；动机 | |
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62
valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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63
candor
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| n.坦白，率真 | |
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64
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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65
partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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jeopardizes
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| 危及，损害( jeopardize的第三人称单数 ) | |
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67
implementation
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| n.实施，贯彻 | |
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68
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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69
remorse
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| n.痛恨，悔恨，自责 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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72
demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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vocal
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| adj.直言不讳的；嗓音的；n.[pl.]声乐节目 | |
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74
fervent
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| adj.热的，热烈的，热情的 | |
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75
dedication
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| n.奉献，献身，致力，题献，献辞 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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77
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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78
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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stamina
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| n.体力；精力；耐力 | |
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80
suffocated
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| （使某人）窒息而死( suffocate的过去式和过去分词 )； （将某人）闷死； 让人感觉闷热； 憋气 | |
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81
redeemed
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| adj. 可赎回的，可救赎的 动词redeem的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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82
humiliate
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| v.使羞辱，使丢脸[同]disgrace | |
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83
dedicated
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| adj.一心一意的；献身的；热诚的 | |
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84
lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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