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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, and Distinguished1 Members of the Congress:
I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility2 and great pride -- humility in the wake of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me; pride in the reflection that this forum3 of legislative4 debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised. Here are centered the hopes and aspirations5 and faith of the entire human race. I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan6 cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely7 expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.
I address you with neither rancor8 nor bitterness in the fading twilight9 of life, with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country. The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector10, oblivious11 to those of another, is but to court disaster for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as the Gateway12 to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the Gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other. There are those who claim our strength is inadequate13 to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism. If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort. The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You can not appease14 or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously15 undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.
Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia. Before one may objectively assess the situation now existing there, he must comprehend something of Asia's past and the revolutionary changes which have marked her course up to the present. Long exploited by the so-called colonial powers, with little opportunity to achieve any degree of social justice, individual dignity, or a higher standard of life such as guided our own noble administration in the Philippines, the peoples of Asia found their opportunity in the war just past to throw off the shackles17 of colonialism and now see the dawn of new opportunity, a heretofore unfelt dignity, and the self-respect of political freedom.
Mustering18 half of the earth's population, and 60 percent of its natural resources these peoples are rapidly consolidating19 a new force, both moral and material, with which to raise the living standard and erect20 adaptations of the design of modern progress to their own distinct cultural environments. Whether one adheres to the concept of colonization21 or not, this is the direction of Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the shift of the world economic frontiers as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates back toward the area whence it started.
In this situation, it becomes vital that our own country orient its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary16 condition rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial era is now past and the Asian peoples covet23 the right to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding, and support -- not imperious direction -- the dignity of equality and not the shame of subjugation25. Their pre-war standard of life, pitifully low, is infinitely27 lower now in the devastation28 left in war's wake. World ideologies29 play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. What the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization30 of the normal nationalist urge for political freedom. These political-social conditions have but an indirect bearing upon our own national security, but do form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls31 of unrealism.
Of more direct and immediately bearing upon our national security are the changes wrought32 in the strategic potential of the Pacific Ocean in the course of the past war. Prior thereto the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the literal line of the Americas, with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines. That salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack.
The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas. All this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which became a vast moat to protect us as long as we held it. Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Mariannas held by us and our free allies. From this island chain we can dominate with sea and air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore -- with sea and air power every port, as I said, from Vladivostok to Singapore -- and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific.
*Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort.* No amphibious force can be successful without control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval33 and air supremacy34 and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental35 Asia toward us or our friends in the Pacific would be doomed36 to failure.
Under such conditions, the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective37 invader38. It assumes, instead, the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense39 is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense. It envisions no attack against anyone, nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained, would be an invincible40 defense against aggression41. The holding of this literal defense line in the western Pacific is entirely42 dependent upon holding all segments thereof; for any major breach43 of that line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to determined44 attack every other major segment.
This is a military estimate as to which I have yet to find a military leader who will take exception. For that reason, I have strongly recommended in the past, as a matter of military urgency, that under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control. Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan and might well force our western frontier back to the coast of California, Oregon and Washington.
To understand the changes which now appear upon the Chinese mainland, one must understand the changes in Chinese character and culture over the past 50 years. China, up to 50 years ago, was completely non-homogenous, being compartmented into groups divided against each other. The war-making tendency was almost non-existent, as they still followed the tenets of the Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. At the turn of the century, under the regime of Chang Tso Lin, efforts toward greater homogeneity produced the start of a nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek, but has been brought to its greatest fruition under the present regime to the point that it has now taken on the character of a united nationalism of increasingly dominant45, aggressive tendencies.
Through these past 50 years the Chinese people have thus become militarized in their concepts and in their ideals. They now constitute excellent soldiers, with competent staffs and commanders. This has produced a new and dominant power in Asia, which, for its own purposes, is allied46 with Soviet47 Russia but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively imperialistic48, with a lust49 for expansion and increased power normal to this type of imperialism50.
There is little of the ideological51 concept either one way or another in the Chinese make-up. The standard of living is so low and the capital accumulation has been so thoroughly52 dissipated by war that the masses are desperate and eager to follow any leadership which seems to promise the alleviation53 of local stringencies.
I have from the beginning believed that the Chinese Communists' support of the North Koreans was the dominant one. Their interests are, at present, parallel with those of the Soviet. But I believe that the aggressiveness recently displayed not only in Korea but also in Indo-China and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the South reflects predominantly the same lust for the expansion of power which has animated54 every would-be conqueror55 since the beginning of time.
The Japanese people, since the war, have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a commendable56 will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left in war's wake, erected57 in Japan an edifice58 dedicated59 to the supremacy of individual liberty and personal dignity; and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative government committed to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice.
Politically, economically, and socially Japan is now abreast60 of many free nations of the earth and will not again fail the universal trust. That it may be counted upon to wield61 a profoundly beneficial influence over the course of events in Asia is attested62 by the magnificent manner in which the Japanese people have met the recent challenge of war, unrest, and confusion surrounding them from the outside and checked communism within their own frontiers without the slightest slackening in their forward progress. I sent all four of our occupation divisions to the Korean battlefront without the slightest qualms63 as to the effect of the resulting power vacuum upon Japan. The results fully26 justified64 my faith. I know of no nation more serene65, orderly, and industrious66, nor in which higher hopes can be entertained for future constructive67 service in the advance of the human race.
Of our former ward22, the Philippines, we can look forward in confidence that the existing unrest will be corrected and a strong and healthy nation will grow in the longer aftermath of war's terrible destructiveness. We must be patient and understanding and never fail them -- as in our hour of need, they did not fail us. A Christian68 nation, the Philippines stand as a mighty69 bulwark70 of Christianity in the Far East, and its capacity for high moral leadership in Asia is unlimited71.
On Formosa, the government of the Republic of China has had the opportunity to refute by action much of the malicious72 gossip which so undermined the strength of its leadership on the Chinese mainland. The Formosan people are receiving a just and enlightened administration with majority representation on the organs of government, and politically, economically, and socially they appear to be advancing along sound and constructive lines.
With this brief insight into the surrounding areas, I now turn to the Korean conflict. While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one, as we hurled73 back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.
This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated74 when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders75; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy.
Such decisions have not been forthcoming.
While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.
Apart from the military need, as I saw It, to neutralize76 the sanctuary77 protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary: first the intensification78 of our economic blockade against China; two the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast; three removal of restrictions79 on air reconnaissance of China's coastal80 areas and of Manchuria;four removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the common enemy.
For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities81 to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless82 American and allied lives, I have been severely83 criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint84 Chiefs of Staff.
I called for reinforcements but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize85 the friendly Chinese Force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor86 from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.
We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver87 and in an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized88 its full military potential. I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution.
Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said, in effect, that I was a warmonger89. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition90, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe91 has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. Indeed, on the second day of September, nineteen hundred and forty-five, just following the surrender of the Japanese nation on the Battleship Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:
"Men since the beginning of time have
sought peace. Various methods through the
ages have been attempted to devise an
international process to prevent or settle
disputes between nations. From the very
start workable methods were found in so
far as individual citizens were concerned,
but the mechanics of an instrumentality of
larger international scope have never
been successful. Military alliances,
balances of power, Leagues of Nations,
all in turn failed, leaving the only path to
be by way of the crucible92 of war. The
utter destructiveness of war now blocks
out this alternative. We have had our last
chance. If we will not devise some
greater and more equitable93 system,
Armageddon will be at our door. The
problem basically is theological and
involves a spiritual recrudescence and
improvement of human character that will
synchronize94 with our almost matchless
advances in science, art, literature, and all
material and cultural developments of
the past 2000 years. It must be of the spirit
if we are to save the flesh."
sought peace. Various methods through the
ages have been attempted to devise an
international process to prevent or settle
disputes between nations. From the very
start workable methods were found in so
far as individual citizens were concerned,
but the mechanics of an instrumentality of
larger international scope have never
been successful. Military alliances,
balances of power, Leagues of Nations,
all in turn failed, leaving the only path to
be by way of the crucible92 of war. The
utter destructiveness of war now blocks
out this alternative. We have had our last
chance. If we will not devise some
greater and more equitable93 system,
Armageddon will be at our door. The
problem basically is theological and
involves a spiritual recrudescence and
improvement of human character that will
synchronize94 with our almost matchless
advances in science, art, literature, and all
material and cultural developments of
the past 2000 years. It must be of the spirit
if we are to save the flesh."
But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end.
War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.
In war there is no substitute for victory.
There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement95 but begets96 new and bloodier97 war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham24 peace. Like blackmail98, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative.
"Why," my soldiers asked of me, "surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field?" I could not answer.
Some may say: to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention99. Neither explanation seems valid100, for China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh101 its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis.
The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is confined to its territorial102 limits. It condemns103 that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating104 impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries105 are fully protected from such attack and devastation.
Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude106 of the Korean people defies description.
They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don't scuttle107 the Pacific!"
I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there, and I can report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way.
It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage108 conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish109 and anxiety.
I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on theplain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads112 of that day which proclaimed most proudly that "old soldiers never die; they just fade away."
And like the old soldier of that ballad111, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.
Good Bye.
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1
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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humility
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| n.谦逊，谦恭 | |
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forum
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| n.论坛，讨论会 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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aspirations
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| 强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 )； 志向； 发送气音； 发 h 音 | |
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partisan
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| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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rancor
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| n.深仇，积怨 | |
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twilight
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| n.暮光，黄昏；暮年，晚期，衰落时期 | |
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sector
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| n.部门，部分；防御地段，防区；扇形 | |
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oblivious
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| adj.易忘的，遗忘的，忘却的，健忘的 | |
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gateway
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| n.大门口，出入口，途径，方法 | |
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inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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appease
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| v.安抚，缓和，平息，满足 | |
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simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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evolutionary
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| adj.进化的；演化的，演变的；[生]进化论的 | |
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17
shackles
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| 手铐( shackle的名词复数 )； 脚镣； 束缚； 羁绊 | |
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mustering
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| v.集合，召集，集结（尤指部队）( muster的现在分词 )；（自他人处）搜集某事物；聚集；激发 | |
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19
consolidating
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| v.（使）巩固， （使）加强( consolidate的现在分词 )；（使）合并 | |
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erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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21
colonization
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| 殖民地的开拓，殖民，殖民地化； 移殖 | |
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ward
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| n.守卫，监护，病房，行政区，由监护人或法院保护的人（尤指儿童）；vt.守护，躲开 | |
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23
covet
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| vt.垂涎；贪图(尤指属于他人的东西) | |
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24
sham
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| n./adj.假冒(的)，虚伪(的) | |
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25
subjugation
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| n.镇压，平息，征服 | |
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26
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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27
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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28
devastation
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| n.毁坏；荒废；极度震惊或悲伤 | |
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29
ideologies
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| n.思想（体系）( ideology的名词复数 )；思想意识；意识形态；观念形态 | |
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30
realization
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| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
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31
pitfalls
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| （捕猎野兽用的）陷阱( pitfall的名词复数 )； 意想不到的困难，易犯的错误 | |
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32
wrought
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| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
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33
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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34
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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35
continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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36
doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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37
prospective
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| adj.预期的，未来的，前瞻性的 | |
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38
invader
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| n.侵略者，侵犯者，入侵者 | |
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39
defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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40
invincible
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| adj.不可征服的，难以制服的 | |
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41
aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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42
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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43
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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44
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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45
dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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46
allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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47
Soviet
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| adj.苏联的，苏维埃的；n.苏维埃 | |
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48
imperialistic
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| 帝国主义的，帝制的 | |
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49
lust
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| n.性(淫)欲；渴(欲)望；vi.对…有强烈的欲望 | |
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50
imperialism
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| n.帝国主义，帝国主义政策 | |
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51
ideological
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| a.意识形态的 | |
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52
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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53
alleviation
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| n. 减轻，缓和，解痛物 | |
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54
animated
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| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
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conqueror
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| n.征服者，胜利者 | |
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56
commendable
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| adj.值得称赞的 | |
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57
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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58
edifice
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| n.宏伟的建筑物(如宫殿，教室) | |
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59
dedicated
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| adj.一心一意的；献身的；热诚的 | |
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60
abreast
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| adv.并排地；跟上(时代)的步伐，与…并进地 | |
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61
wield
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| vt.行使，运用，支配；挥，使用(武器等) | |
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attested
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| adj.经检验证明无病的，经检验证明无菌的v.证明( attest的过去式和过去分词 )；证实；声称…属实；使宣誓 | |
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63
qualms
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| n.不安；内疚 | |
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64
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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65
serene
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| adj. 安详的，宁静的，平静的 | |
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66
industrious
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| adj.勤劳的，刻苦的，奋发的 | |
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67
constructive
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| adj.建设的，建设性的 | |
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68
Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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69
mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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70
bulwark
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| n.堡垒，保障，防御 | |
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71
unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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72
malicious
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| adj.有恶意的，心怀恶意的 | |
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73
hurled
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| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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74
contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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75
invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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76
neutralize
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| v.使失效、抵消，使中和 | |
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77
sanctuary
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| n.圣所，圣堂，寺庙；禁猎区，保护区 | |
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78
intensification
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| n.激烈化，增强明暗度；加厚 | |
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79
restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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80
coastal
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| adj.海岸的，沿海的，沿岸的 | |
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81
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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82
countless
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| adj.无数的，多得不计其数的 | |
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83
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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84
joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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85
utilize
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| vt.使用，利用 | |
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86
succor
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| n.援助，帮助；v.给予帮助 | |
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87
maneuver
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| n.策略[pl.]演习；v.(巧妙)控制；用策略 | |
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88
utilized
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| v.利用，使用( utilize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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89
warmonger
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| n.战争贩子，好战者，主战论者 | |
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90
abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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91
foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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92
crucible
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| n.坩锅，严酷的考验 | |
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93
equitable
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| adj.公平的；公正的 | |
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94
synchronize
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| v.使同步 [=synchronise] | |
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95
appeasement
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| n.平息，满足 | |
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96
begets
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| v.为…之生父( beget的第三人称单数 )；产生，引起 | |
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bloodier
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| adj.血污的( bloody的比较级 )；流血的；屠杀的；残忍的 | |
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blackmail
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| n.讹诈，敲诈，勒索，胁迫，恫吓 | |
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99
intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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100
valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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101
mesh
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| n.网孔，网丝，陷阱；vt.以网捕捉，啮合，匹配；vi.适合； [计算机]网络 | |
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102
territorial
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| adj.领土的，领地的 | |
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103
condemns
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| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的第三人称单数 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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104
devastating
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| adj.毁灭性的，令人震惊的，强有力的 | |
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105
sanctuaries
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| n.避难所( sanctuary的名词复数 )；庇护；圣所；庇护所 | |
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106
fortitude
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| n.坚忍不拔；刚毅 | |
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107
scuttle
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| v.急赶，疾走，逃避；n.天窗；舷窗 | |
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108
savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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109
anguish
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| n.(尤指心灵上的)极度痛苦，烦恼 | |
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110
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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111
ballad
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| n.歌谣，民谣，流行爱情歌曲 | |
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112
ballads
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| 民歌，民谣，特别指叙述故事的歌( ballad的名词复数 )； 讴 | |
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