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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
By David Axe1
Wardak Province, Afghanistan
16 September 2009
Analysts2 and policy makers3 call it "smart power" -- a seamless blend of investment, good deeds and military force that is intended to win friends while targeting enemies in war. In 2007, the U.S. Defense4 Department officially embraced this philosophy. But on the ground in Afghanistan, U.S. forces are finding it difficult to be humanitarians6 and builders as well as soldiers.
US Army soldiers in Afghanistan
Soldiers from the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division march into Kowt-e-Ashrow in Wardak Province, southwest of Kabul.
Wardak has seen bloody7 fighting in recent months as the Taliban expands its presence and U.S. reinforcements trickle8 in. Heavily armed American patrols are a common sight in local villages.
This day, Afghan and American soldiers have come bearing gifts.
School supplies for children, election materials for adults and tiny Afghan flags for everyone.
The aid is part of a two-year-old strategy for boosting the popularity of U.S.-led forces among everyday Afghans. It is an approach that the Pentagon and Army Command Sergent Major Andrew Spano of the 10th Mountain Division hope will turn the Afghan people against the Taliban.
"We focus our young leaders on how to take the 'human terrain9' away from the enemies of Afghanistan," Spano explains, "The human terrain being the people of this country."
U.S. Secertary of Defense Robert Gates first championed this friends-first strategy two years ago. He called it, "smart power" as in a smart mix of combat, aid, reconstruction10 and diplomacy11.
But on the ground in Wardak, some soldiers say smart power is not working.
Infantrymen are some of the toughest critics. They have spent most of their time training for firefights, not aid work. Before deploying13, Command Sergent Major Andrew Spano says they received a crash course in interacting with the Afghan people. "Anything that takes you away from our normal infantry12 tasks can be difficult," he says, "But when we trained; we did exercises -- the brigade spent a lot of money using American citizens of Afghan descent to be role players. That helped us be ready."
Still, many soldiers say they typically do not spend enough time in one community to build lasting14 ties with the Afghan people. Company commanders are expected to build personal relationships with local leaders. But these in-demand leaders come and go every six months.
Army Lieutenant15 Colonel Kimo Gallahue says coalition16 forces are spread too thin to make smart power work. "There was only one rifle company here to augment17 and assist Afghan security forces," he says, "Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan requires boots on the ground. That's where we're at."
And, Gallahue says, with violence escalating18, many Army units do not have the time to conduct humanitarian5 and development work. "Security has to come first. And right behind that is development and governance," he states.
1 axe | |
n.斧子;v.用斧头砍,削减 | |
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2 analysts | |
分析家,化验员( analyst的名词复数 ) | |
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3 makers | |
n.制造者,制造商(maker的复数形式) | |
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4 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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5 humanitarian | |
n.人道主义者,博爱者,基督凡人论者 | |
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6 humanitarians | |
n.慈善家( humanitarian的名词复数 ) | |
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7 bloody | |
adj.非常的的;流血的;残忍的;adv.很;vt.血染 | |
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8 trickle | |
vi.淌,滴,流出,慢慢移动,逐渐消散 | |
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9 terrain | |
n.地面,地形,地图 | |
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10 reconstruction | |
n.重建,再现,复原 | |
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11 diplomacy | |
n.外交;外交手腕,交际手腕 | |
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12 infantry | |
n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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13 deploying | |
(尤指军事行动)使展开( deploy的现在分词 ); 施展; 部署; 有效地利用 | |
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14 lasting | |
adj.永久的,永恒的;vbl.持续,维持 | |
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15 lieutenant | |
n.陆军中尉,海军上尉;代理官员,副职官员 | |
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16 coalition | |
n.结合体,同盟,结合,联合 | |
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17 augment | |
vt.(使)增大,增加,增长,扩张 | |
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18 escalating | |
v.(使)逐步升级( escalate的现在分词 );(使)逐步扩大;(使)更高;(使)更大 | |
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