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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED NPR BROADCAST)
STEVE INSKEEP, HOST:
Ambassador John Bolton is re-entering the public debate with a talk here on NPR. Since the president fired his national security adviser1 in September, Bolton has largely avoided the media. He also did not talk with House impeachment2 investigators3. They heard much testimony4 about Bolton but nothing from him. He says courts should decide if an adviser like him should testify. Bolton also has not discussed the policy differences that led President Trump5 to fire the veteran diplomat6 in a tweet. But in recent weeks, Bolton regained7 control of the Twitter account he used while in the White House, and he posted what sounded like a criticism of President Trump's approach to North Korea. The U.S. blocked its allies' efforts to examine North Korea's human rights abuses at the United Nations, and Bolton tweeted that the U.S. should be mobilizing its friends against North Korea and should not obstruct8 them. So we called Ambassador Bolton to ask what was on his mind. He came to the phone for an exclusive interview.
I actually want to begin with your tweet on December 10. Were you referring to canceling a U.N. human rights session on North Korea?
JOHN BOLTON: Yes, there was a lot of talk about whether the United States should go forward with that, should accept it - it was suggested by a number of our European allies. I thought it was an excellent point to talk about. I think whenever the Europeans get interested in the North Korean situation, that's to our advantage - I think it's useful to remind them that many of the same complaints could be made about Iran. And I think it's also fine to talk about the North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs. But the idea, at least as reported in the press, that the United States opposed a session on North Korean human rights for fear of offending Kim Jong Un would have been a big mistake.
INSKEEP: Well, that seems to be what has happened. How much did the United States damage itself?
BOLTON: Well, I don't think you damage yourself by telling the truth about a country, and I think it's emblematic9 of regimes like North Korea and Iran that not only are they rogue10 states seeking deliverable nuclear weapons, but they're also state sponsors of terrorism and, on the side, repress their own population. I mean, I think there are characteristics about these regimes that tell us a lot about the way they behave.
INSKEEP: Ambassador, is it possible to get a North Korea nuclear deal that is worth having at all?
BOLTON: I don't believe so because I don't think North Korea will ever voluntarily give up nuclear weapons. It's been the pattern as we've watched it for over three decades now. The North Koreans are very happy to declare that they're going to give up their nuclear weapons program, particularly when it's in exchange for tangible11 economic benefits, but they never get around to doing it. And I think the inescapable conclusion is they're happy to sell that same bridge over and over again, but there's no serious chance they will ever voluntarily give it up.
INSKEEP: Is it a mistake for the United States to keep trying, given that countries like China and Russia, North Korea's friends, demand some kind of diplomatic process to keep up economic sanctions?
BOLTON: Well, you know, if they don't want to keep the economic sanctions up, which are, after all, part of U.N. Security Council resolutions, they being permanent members of the Security Council, then I think that tells them something about them as well. The condition should be that North Korea doesn't develop weapons of mass destruction, and I include in there chemical and biological as well as nuclear weapons. The Chinese, for example, say they are opposed to a North Korean nuclear weapon because it will destabilize East Asia and impair12 their economic development. Well, taking the Chinese at their word, they should want to enforce the sanctions for their own safety.
INSKEEP: You would hope so. But, of course, they're urging that the sanctions be eased at this time. Is it a mistake for the United States to keep trying for some kind of deal?
BOLTON: Well, I take everything that North Korea says with a big grain of salt. There may or may not be some development toward the end of the year. I think part of this may be bluff13 on their part. They think the president's desperate for a deal, and if they put an artificial time constraint14 on it, they may think they're going to get a better deal. We'll just have to wait and see. But this is all part of the North Korean playbook. They've successfully jived the three prior American administrations, and they plan to do the same with this one.
INSKEEP: Is this administration at risk of being - did you say - jived?
BOLTON: Well, I think you have to approach North Korea with the view that they're not going to voluntarily give up their nuclear weapons program. There's simply no evidence, and there never has been for decades, that they're making a strategic decision not to proceed. And the nature of the way North Korea wants to negotiate, what they call action for action, invariably benefits the would-be nuclear weapons state because they get economic benefits that are much more important to them than the minimal15 concessions16 they make on the nuclear side.
And here's the key point - time is almost always on the side of the proliferator17. The more time they have, the more they can overcome all the technological18 and scientific difficulties to perfecting a deliverable nuclear weapons capability19. So the fact that they're not doing anything today and they didn't do anything yesterday that we can see is not a good sign. It probably just means we're not seeing it. But the longer time goes on, the greater their capability will become.
INSKEEP: Did differences over North Korea influence your departure from the White House, Ambassador?
BOLTON: Well, you know, I'm going to have my say on all that in due course, and I'll be happy to talk to you about it when the time is appropriate.
INSKEEP: Oh, and people will know you have a book coming out among various other forums20. I guess I can ask, though, if impeachment, which the president now faces, weakens the president's hand when it comes to confronting a country like North Korea?
BOLTON: Well, you know, there's obviously a lot swirling21 around in that department, including some litigation that could affect my status. So I think, although I have a lot to say on the subject, the prudent22 course for me is just to decline to comment at this point.
INSKEEP: Oh, you don't want to talk about anything relating to impeachment. Are you able to give your view of this, though - why do you think the House, which asked for your testimony, did not then formally subpoena23 you?
BOLTON: Honestly, you'll have to ask them.
INSKEEP: Why not testify? People ask. I want you to have an opportunity to answer that.
BOLTON: Well, I appreciate that. But as I say, Dr. Kupperman, my former deputy, is in litigation now on what, to me, is a critical separation of powers question. When the House issues a subpoena, and in his case, and I think it would be true in mine, the president tells him not to testify, which authority controls? Dr. Kupperman went to court to seek the third branch's opinion in this conflict between the first two. I think that's a very important issue that needs to be resolved. When he went to court, the House withdrew their subpoena of him.
INSKEEP: This is Charles Kupperman, another official who has been summoned. And when you say they withdrew the subpoena, are you saying you think that maybe a court would find on the side of you not having to testify or not being allowed to testify?
BOLTON: Well, you know, Dr. Kupperman took the position in his case that he wasn't going to weigh in on the merits of either side. If the court determined24 he should testify, he was prepared to do it. But ironically, both the executive branch and the legislative25 branch didn't want the court to reach the merits. That case is still under advisement. So we're still hoping for a decision that will tell Dr. Kupperman which way he needs to go.
INSKEEP: Ambassador Bolton, it's been a pleasure. Thank you so much.
BOLTON: Well, thanks for having me.
INSKEEP: That's our conversation yesterday afternoon with fired national security adviser John Bolton, who has been largely silent and largely out of the media since he was dismissed from office in September.
1 adviser | |
n.劝告者,顾问 | |
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2 impeachment | |
n.弹劾;控告;怀疑 | |
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3 investigators | |
n.调查者,审查者( investigator的名词复数 ) | |
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4 testimony | |
n.证词;见证,证明 | |
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5 trump | |
n.王牌,法宝;v.打出王牌,吹喇叭 | |
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6 diplomat | |
n.外交官,外交家;能交际的人,圆滑的人 | |
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7 regained | |
复得( regain的过去式和过去分词 ); 赢回; 重回; 复至某地 | |
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8 obstruct | |
v.阻隔,阻塞(道路、通道等);n.阻碍物,障碍物 | |
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9 emblematic | |
adj.象征的,可当标志的;象征性 | |
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10 rogue | |
n.流氓;v.游手好闲 | |
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11 tangible | |
adj.有形的,可触摸的,确凿的,实际的 | |
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12 impair | |
v.损害,损伤;削弱,减少 | |
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13 bluff | |
v.虚张声势,用假象骗人;n.虚张声势,欺骗 | |
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14 constraint | |
n.(on)约束,限制;限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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15 minimal | |
adj.尽可能少的,最小的 | |
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16 concessions | |
n.(尤指由政府或雇主给予的)特许权( concession的名词复数 );承认;减价;(在某地的)特许经营权 | |
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17 proliferator | |
[医]增殖子 | |
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18 technological | |
adj.技术的;工艺的 | |
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19 capability | |
n.能力;才能;(pl)可发展的能力或特性等 | |
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20 forums | |
讨论会; 座谈会; 广播专题讲话节目; 集会的公共场所( forum的名词复数 ); 论坛,讨论会,专题讨论节目; 法庭 | |
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21 swirling | |
v.旋转,打旋( swirl的现在分词 ) | |
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22 prudent | |
adj.谨慎的,有远见的,精打细算的 | |
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23 subpoena | |
n.(法律)传票;v.传讯 | |
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24 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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25 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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