-
(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
GWEN IFILL: Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered his annual state of the nation speech today. Defiant1 in the face of international sanctions, he boasted of his country's incursions into Ukraine and the annexation2 of Crimea, reiterating3 that it belongs to his nation.
PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN, Russia (through interpreter): For Russia, Crimea, ancient Korsun, Khersones, Sevastopol have a major civilizational sacred meaning, the same as the Temple Mount in Jerusalem has for those who confess Islam and Judaism. And this is exactly how we will treat it from here forever.
GWEN IFILL: For many observers, the speech was classic Putin, using television to assert his view of reality to his own people and the world.
Putin's use of the medium is the subject of a new book, "Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible," by Peter Pomerantsev, a Russian-born British writer and television producer. He returned to Moscow to work in the Kremlin's vast television apparatus4, creating Russian reality TV shows.
MARGARET WARNER: So, Peter Pomerantsev, thank you for joining us.
You have described television as the nuclear weapon of politics in Russia.
PETER POMERANTSEV, Author, "Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia": Yes, it takes on a — it's at the core of the political system.
You have to imagine a country that is absolutely huge. It's about a sixth of the world's land mass and it's also sociologically very varied6. So you have sort of very contemporary towns like Moscow, and then you have near feudal7 villages, which have a completely different sense of reality.
And the only thing that brings them together is the television. Television is at the core of the present political system.
MARGARET WARNER: You say, now, at the center of all of this is the president himself as performance artist. What do you mean?
PETER POMERANTSEV: Putin was no one. He was this great guy famous for wearing horrible suits everywhere he went. Nobody would notice him in meetings. He was a no one.
And they took him and created him to be what we know today, oligarchs who control TV, and P.R. TV producer guys who were very close to the KGB. It's this incredible mix of secret services and television producers. And they made him into sort of a hero for all seasons.
So he could be the president who is the ideal lover, the ideal matcher guy, the ideal businessman. And this was all done through television. And the first thing that Vladimir Putin did in 2000, when he came to power, was to get rid of the oligarchs who controlled television and take it over.
MARGARET WARNER: And at a very young age, from London, you got a chance to get in on the inside. You describe this one organization that essentially8, you said, controls everything on television, entertainment and news.
PETER POMERANTSEV: That place is actually the Kremlin.
There was always a telephone to all the major TV channels, but all kind of coordinated9 by the Kremlin itself.
MARGARET WARNER: But you started out as a producer for one of the networks in that big apparatus called TNT doing reality shows.
It sounds harmless, sounds apolitical enough.
PETER POMERANTSEV: Around 2000, TV started making a lot of money. And they wanted to get producers from the West to come and make their version of "The Apprentice10" or "Housewives of New York."
And that's why they needed people like me. You have to understand the Kremlin is very, very aware that they have to make TV entertaining nowadays. Their aim is kind of synthesize political manipulation and entertainment.
And so very soon, I found that even entertainment had this sort of very insidious11 element of social control. Politics has become like a reality show. So, you have debates on Russian TV. They're completely sort of scripted from the Kremlin.
So, you have a puppet right-wing opposition12, a puppet left opposition. They kind of shout at each other. And the result is to make you feel, oh, my God, Putin is in the middle and kind of let's have Putin instead, the opposition is mad. People become very malleable13. The population becomes almost sort of incapable14 of critical analysis. So, that's a much sort of deeper form of manipulation.
MARGARET WARNER: This has much broader international implications. This isn't just a problem for Russia.
PETER POMERANTSEV: Well, increasingly, the Kremlin has been thinking about information in terms of — basically as a weapon, weaponized information. It's a tool to distract, demoralize the enemy, to be used as a decoy in a military operation.
So now you have a huge international sort of broadcasting arm being set up by the Kremlin, whose aim is really to sort of do psychological operations against Russia's enemies, whether that's Ukraine or increasingly the West.
MARGARET WARNER: And we have certainly seen it play out in Ukraine.
PETER POMERANTSEV: Well, in Ukraine, it's been total.
That's really been the new thing about this war in Ukraine. So, there's a small military operation, covert15 mainly, and 98 percent propaganda. They are using the idea of freedom of information, which is something that we value very much, to do disinformation.
Let's say Russia today after the MH-17 crash spits out tens of conspiracy16 theories about why it might have happened. The idea that Ukrainians thought it was President Putin's personal plane and they shot it down? They're not doing this out of a search for the truth. They're not doing this out of a passion for investigative journalism17.
They're doing this to kind of muddy the waters as quickly as possible.
MARGARET WARNER: Now, one of the great mysteries in the West is why, as the sanctions tighten18 around Russia, as oil prices drop, as Russia's headed into recession next year, Putin remains19 wildly popular.
PETER POMERANTSEV: In Russia, love is always very close to fear. So, when 84 percent of say they love Vladimir Putin, they might almost be saying that they fear him.
MARGARET WARNER: Is there something about him that touches something in the Russian soul?
PETER POMERANTSEV: I think they have manipulated it to make people feel that there is something in him which touches the Russian soul.
Listen, his polls were doing very, very badly after coming back into power. They started a big war in order to get his ratings up. And 84 percent is what Bush had after the start of Iraq. It's the classic figure for a wartime president. And the question is, how are they going to hold this? Are they going to have invent new wars?
And you have to understand who the war is with. So, Russia isn't in a war with Ukraine, according to Russian propaganda. It is at war with America. It's kind of this funny thing. America is like barely paying attention to Russia. Russia, if you watch Russian TV and if you increasingly talk to Russians, is now at war with America.
MARGARET WARNER: Peter Pomerantsev, thank you so much.
PETER POMERANTSEV: My pleasure.
点击收听单词发音
1 defiant | |
adj.无礼的,挑战的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
2 annexation | |
n.吞并,合并 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
3 reiterating | |
反复地说,重申( reiterate的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
4 apparatus | |
n.装置,器械;器具,设备 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
5 spoke | |
n.(车轮的)辐条;轮辐;破坏某人的计划;阻挠某人的行动 v.讲,谈(speak的过去式);说;演说;从某种观点来说 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
6 varied | |
adj.多样的,多变化的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
7 feudal | |
adj.封建的,封地的,领地的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
8 essentially | |
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
9 coordinated | |
adj.协调的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
10 apprentice | |
n.学徒,徒弟 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
11 insidious | |
adj.阴险的,隐匿的,暗中为害的,(疾病)不知不觉之间加剧 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
12 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
13 malleable | |
adj.(金属)可锻的;有延展性的;(性格)可训练的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
14 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
15 covert | |
adj.隐藏的;暗地里的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
16 conspiracy | |
n.阴谋,密谋,共谋 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
17 journalism | |
n.新闻工作,报业 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
18 tighten | |
v.(使)变紧;(使)绷紧 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
19 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
参考例句: |
|
|