PBS高端访谈:政府能否在保护隐私的同时使用特殊的加密措施?

 　　GWEN IFILL: Earlier in the day, the Obama administration went to Capitol Hill to make its case to allow government great access to encrypted information. Essentially¹, the government wants to be able to read certain data that intelligence agencies cannot get now because it's been protected with special codes. That's at the heart of an ongoing² battle with tech companies.

　　JAMES COMEY, FBI Director: Encryption is a great thing. It keeps us all safe. It protects innovation.

　　GWEN IFILL: But, FBI Director James Comey warned at Senate hearings today, it's also a double-edged sword. That's because the technologies that seal off smartphones from surveillance also impede³ efforts to track criminals and terrorists.

　　JAMES COMEY: We are moving inexorably to a place where all of our lives, all of our papers and effects, all of our communications will be covered by universal strong encryption. And that is a world that in some ways is wonderful and in some ways has serious public safety ramifications⁴.

　　GWEN IFILL: Google, Apple and other tech firms have ramped⁵ up data encryption in the wake of Edward Snowden's revelations of sweeping⁶ government surveillance. They're also responding to stepped-up hacking⁷ coming from Russia and China.

　　But, at the same time, Islamic State followers⁸ and other militants⁹ are now using encrypted communications to recruit at a rapid pace. Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates underscored that point today.

　　SALLY YATES, Deputy Attorney General: ISIL currently communicates on Twitter, sending communications to thousands of would-be followers right here in our country. When someone responds and the conversations begin, they are then directed to encrypted platforms for further communication.

　　And even with a court order, we can't see those communications. This is a serious threat. And our inability to access these communications with valid¹⁰ court orders is a real national security problem.

　　GWEN IFILL: And the FBI's Comey suggested it's just a matter of time before that leads to a terror attack.

　　JAMES COMEY: We are stopping these things so far through tremendous hard work, the use of sources, the use of online undercovers, but it is incredibly difficult. I cannot see me stopping these indefinitely.

　　GWEN IFILL: In a new report, 14 of the world's top cryptographers and computer scientists argue that giving the government access will compromise commercial and consumer secrets.

　　PETER SWIRE, Georgia Institute of Technology: We're in a golden age of surveillance, not darkness.

　　GWEN IFILL: Others focused today on privacy concerns. Peter Swire, with the Georgia Institute of Technology, said the government already has plenty of ways to track people.

　　PETER SWIRE: For the first time in human history, most of us carry tracking devices called cell phones. And when you add in video surveillance and the upcoming Internet of things, evidence about a suspect's whereabouts at a time and date is far, far more often available then ever before.

　　GWEN IFILL: Ultimately, federal officials said, they hope to work with tech firms to strike a balance between privacy interests and public safety.

　　But where is that proper balance?

　　For insight into that debate, we turn to Stewart Baker¹¹, who was assistant secretary of homeland security during the George W. Bush administration and general counsel at the National Security Agency during 1990s. And Susan Landau, she is one of the authors of the report objecting to increased government access. She's a professor of cyber-security policy at the Worcester Polytechnic¹² Institute.

　　Stewart Baker, we have heard James Comey say many things. Among them, he wrote that he — there's no doubt that bad people can communicate and that he essentially can't stop them with impunity¹³. Tell me how that works.

　　STEWART BAKER, Former Homeland Security Department Official: So it is possible now to write codes that no one can break and to use those codes to communicate — to store everything on your phone in an encrypted fashion or to communicate with co-conspirators in a fashion, really for the first time since we have had modern communications, that no government can get into.

　　And so government intel loses, slowly, the ability to understand what people are saying to each other on modern communications. Hasn't happened yet, but it clearly is getting ready to happen as encryption becomes ubiquitous.

　　GWEN IFILL: Susan Landau, what's the danger in having the government have another tool in which they can use to protect us?

　　SUSAN LANDAU, Worcester Polytechnic Institute: So it's not a question of having another tool.

　　The real issue is whether or not we should have what they call exceptional access, access to encrypted communications. And exceptional access described in the abstract sounds good, but you have to actually think about it in particulars.

　　For example, one technology that's been introduced is called forward secrecy¹⁴. Forward secrecy is the idea that you have a key — that you use an ephemeral key to encrypt your communications, so if at any point your key is stolen, all past communications are secure.

　　So, if Sony had become aware, for example, when its keys were stolen, when its data was stolen, all — it could have changed keys and no new communications could have been intercepted¹⁵, but even more importantly, all the old communications would have been safe against the people who hacked¹⁶ Sony.

　　SUSAN LANDAU: So, that's the issue. The issue is…

　　GWEN IFILL: Go ahead.

　　SUSAN LANDAU: The issue is that the government is saying exceptional access, without explaining how they want this done, and all security matters in the details.

　　GWEN IFILL: Well, let's talk about that. The government is asking basically for these companies to share their keys, to allow backdoor access to our information for national security purposes. What are the limits of that?

　　STEWART BAKER: So, I think one of the things clear is the government isn't trying to say this is exactly how we want you to do it, because I'm sure that Susan Landau would be saying, well, that won't work and we have got these objections to being told how to do it.

　　The government is saying, here's a problem, we think it needs to be solved, there may be multiple ways to solve it. And, indeed, there are. It is possible, for example, for the companies that make this encryption to keep keys or to store the data encrypted with their own keys, as well as with the users' keys.

　　This is really what the companies were doing until recently.

　　GWEN IFILL: Susan Landau, you wrote somewhere that you consider this magical thinking. Explain why.

　　SUSAN LANDAU: Right.

　　So, when Stu mentions the idea of keeping the data securely at the companies, we have numerous examples. For example, the Google database of surveillance targets was hacked presumably by Chinese hackers¹⁷, and what it did was a great counterintelligence operation that exposed which agents were under U.S. government surveillance.

　　What we have seen over and over again is that, with a determined¹⁸ opponent, the data is not secure. The only way it's secure is if there's end-to-end encryption. I completely agree with Director Comey that it makes the FBI's and law enforcement's job more difficult, but the question is balancing different types of security against each other.

　　And Stu is correct that I want specific suggestions, because the idea that we could come up with some magic solution that solves the problem isn't correct. You need specific solutions. You need to analyze¹⁹ them carefully to see where the security vulnerabilities are, so that you don't introduce more problems.

　　GWEN IFILL: Stewart Baker, what is the government asking for that's different than what they already have?

　　STEWART BAKER: What they want to do is make sure that, as this encryption becomes ubiquitous, that it doesn't leave them completely helpless even when they have a court order.

　　And they're asking companies to take that concern seriously and not simply say, that's not our problem, that's your problem, we're putting end-to-end strong encryption out there, and if terrorists use it or pedophiles use it, that's your problem, too. It's not our problem.

　　And what Jim Comey is saying is, no, that's a social problem, and, yes, there are security risks in building in some capability²⁰ for the government to get access to that, but there are security risks of a very different sort if we don't have access to those communications.

　　GWEN IFILL: And, Susan Landau, is there middle ground here? Is there something that you can imagine the tech companies could concede that would allow the government to get a greater access, but not maybe the blanket access they may desire?

　　SUSAN LANDAU: There is no easy way to enable easy access to everybody's communications and data at rest, unless you have the keys stored in an insecure way, unless you have the systems done in an insecure way.

　　That's why our tech report was very clear, tell us the proposal, don't say you can do it, but tell us the proposal and we can look at it and analyze it. There is also an issue that hasn't yet been brought up, which is that, what happens when you have a multinational²¹ firm and communications between the U.S. and the U.K. or between the U.S. and France or between the U.S. and China?

　　Do both countries have access? How do you manage that? What happens when a U.S. person travels overseas? If we're going to demand this sort of thing, then, of course, other nations will, and then U.S. communications will be quite insecure.

　　GWEN IFILL: Well, it sounds like you're right. There is no easy answer, and not a difficult one either.

　　Susan Landau of the Worcester Polytechnic Institute, and Stewart Baker of Steptoe & Johnson, thank you very much.

　　STEWART BAKER: It's a pleasure.

　　SUSAN LANDAU: Thank you.

1 essentially   

adv.本质上，实质上，基本上

参考例句：

• Really great men are essentially modest.真正的伟人大都很谦虚。
• She is an essentially selfish person.她本质上是个自私自利的人。

2 ongoing   

adj.进行中的，前进的

参考例句：

• The problem is ongoing.这个问题尚未解决。
• The issues raised in the report relate directly to Age Concern's ongoing work in this area.报告中提出的问题与“关心老人”组织在这方面正在做的工作有直接的关系。

3 impede   

v.妨碍，阻碍，阻止

参考例句：

• One shouldn't impede other's progress.一个人不应该妨碍他人进步。
• The muddy roads impede our journey.我们的旅游被泥泞的道路阻挠了。

4 ramifications   

n.结果，后果( ramification的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• These changes are bound to have widespread social ramifications. 这些变化注定会造成许多难以预料的社会后果。
• What are the ramifications of our decision to join the union? 我们决定加入工会会引起哪些后果呢？ 来自《简明英汉词典》

5 ramped   

土堤斜坡( ramp的过去式和过去分词 )； 斜道； 斜路； （装车或上下飞机的）活动梯

参考例句：

• With the arrival of George Lucas, the pace has ramped up. 随着乔治·卢卡斯的到来，速度大大加快。
• They also sold corporate bonds as the global financial crisis ramped up. 在全球金融危机加剧之际，他们还抛售了公司债券。

6 sweeping   

adj.范围广大的，一扫无遗的

参考例句：

• The citizens voted for sweeping reforms.公民投票支持全面的改革。
• Can you hear the wind sweeping through the branches?你能听到风掠过树枝的声音吗？

7 hacking   

n.非法访问计算机系统和数据库的活动

参考例句：

• The patient with emphysema is hacking all day. 这个肺气肿病人整天不断地干咳。
• We undertook the task of hacking our way through the jungle. 我们负责在丛林中开路。

8 followers   

追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件

参考例句：

• the followers of Mahatma Gandhi 圣雄甘地的拥护者
• The reformer soon gathered a band of followers round him. 改革者很快就获得一群追随者支持他。

9 militants   

激进分子，好斗分子( militant的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• The militants have been sporadically fighting the government for years. 几年来，反叛分子一直对政府实施零星的战斗。
• Despite the onslaught, Palestinian militants managed to fire off rockets. 尽管如此，巴勒斯坦的激进分子仍然发射导弹。

10 valid   

adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的

参考例句：

• His claim to own the house is valid.他主张对此屋的所有权有效。
• Do you have valid reasons for your absence?你的缺席有正当理由吗？

11 baker   

n.面包师

参考例句：

• The baker bakes his bread in the bakery.面包师在面包房内烤面包。
• The baker frosted the cake with a mixture of sugar and whites of eggs.面包师在蛋糕上撒了一层白糖和蛋清的混合料。

12 polytechnic   

adj.各种工艺的，综合技术的；n.工艺(专科)学校；理工(专科)学校

参考例句：

• She was trained as a teacher at Manchester Polytechnic.她在曼彻斯特工艺专科学校就读，准备毕业后做老师。
• When he was 17,Einstein entered the Polytechnic Zurich,Switzerland,where he studied mathematics and physics.17岁时，爱因斯坦进入了瑞士苏黎士的专科学院，学习数学和物理学。

13 impunity   

n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除

参考例句：

• You will not escape with impunity.你不可能逃脱惩罚。
• The impunity what compulsory insurance sets does not include escapement.交强险规定的免责范围不包括逃逸。

14 secrecy   

n.秘密，保密，隐蔽

参考例句：

• All the researchers on the project are sworn to secrecy.该项目的所有研究人员都按要求起誓保守秘密。
• Complete secrecy surrounded the meeting.会议在绝对机密的环境中进行。

15 intercepted   

拦截( intercept的过去式和过去分词 )； 截住； 截击； 拦阻

参考例句：

• Reporters intercepted him as he tried to leave the hotel. 他正要离开旅馆，记者们把他拦截住了。
• Reporters intercepted him as he tried to leave by the rear entrance. 他想从后门溜走，记者把他截住了。

16 hacked   

生气

参考例句：

• I hacked the dead branches off. 我把枯树枝砍掉了。
• I'm really hacked off. 我真是很恼火。

17 hackers   

n.计算机迷( hacker的名词复数 )；私自存取或篡改电脑资料者，电脑“黑客”

参考例句：

• They think of viruses that infect an organization from the outside.They envision hackers breaking into their information vaults. 他们考虑来自外部的感染公司的病毒，他们设想黑客侵入到信息宝库中。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Arranging a meeting with the hackers took weeks againoff-again email exchanges. 通过几星期电子邮件往来安排见面，他们最终同意了。 来自互联网

18 determined   

adj.坚定的；有决心的

参考例句：

• I have determined on going to Tibet after graduation.我已决定毕业后去西藏。
• He determined to view the rooms behind the office.他决定查看一下办公室后面的房间。

19 analyze   

vt.分析，解析 (=analyse)

参考例句：

• We should analyze the cause and effect of this event.我们应该分析这场事变的因果。
• The teacher tried to analyze the cause of our failure.老师设法分析我们失败的原因。

20 capability   

n.能力；才能；(pl)可发展的能力或特性等

参考例句：

• She has the capability to become a very fine actress.她有潜力成为杰出演员。
• Organizing a whole department is beyond his capability.组织整个部门是他能力以外的事。

21 multinational   

adj.多国的，多种国籍的；n.多国籍公司，跨国公司

参考例句：

• The firm was taken over by a multinational consulting firm.这家公司被一个跨国咨询公司收购。
• He analyzed the relationship between multinational corporations and under-developed countries.他分析了跨国公司和不发达国家之间的关系。