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(单词翻译:双击或拖选)
GWEN IFILL: The battle over privacy vs. security is back front and center, as Apple digs in against the FBI and the courts over the issue of access to data on its phones.
December 2, 2015, that's the day Syed Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik, went on a murderous rampage in San Bernardino, California, killing1 14 people. Hours later, they were, in turn, killed by police. Ever since, the FBI has been trying to read the contents of a cell phone Farook used.
JAMES COMEY, FBI Director: We still have one of those killers2' phones that we have not been able to open. And it's been over two months now. We're still working on it.
GWEN IFILL: Last week, FBI Director James Comey told a Senate hearing that the Apple iPhone's encryption has made it impossible for the agency to access its content.
Now a federal judge in California has ordered the company to create software that will do just that. But Apple CEO Tim Cook forcefully rejected that order early yesterday, writing in a letter addressed to Apple customers: "In the wrong hands, this software, which doesn't exist today, would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone's physical possession."
White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest disputed that, saying the government wants access only to the single device associated with Farook.
美国法院要求苹果公司协助解锁手机
JOSH EARNEST, White House Press Secretary: We're not asking Apple to redesign its products or to create a new back door to its products. This is a much more specific request that the Department of Justice has put forward.
GWEN IFILL: Apple stepped up its protections after NSA leaker Edward Snowden exposed government surveillance of phone traffic in 2013.
One feature can even erase3 the iPhone's contents after 10 failed attempts to unlock it. Prosecutors4 say they are worried that this feature could be on the phone Farook used. And unless Apple devises a way to unlock it, they could lose all its data. The company now has five days to make its formal response in court.
Now for a look at the wider stakes surrounding this case, we turn to Nate Cardozo, a staff attorney who focuses on digital civil liberties for the Electronic Frontier Foundation. He joins us from San Francisco. And Stewart Baker5, former assistant secretary of homeland security under George W. Bush administration and former general counsel at the National Security Agency. He's now in private practice at Steptoe & Johnson.
Stewart Baker, Tim Cook says that building this access, this back door access to the iPhone, as he describes it, would permanently6 weaken privacy. Is he right?
STEWART BAKER, Former Assistant Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Security: No, I don't think he is.
The order says you must defeat this one security feature, which is the automatic erasing7 of all the information on the phone. And that's not building a permanent back door into anything. That's one phone, one order, one security feature.
GWEN IFILL: So, Nate Cardozo, if it's just one phone, one order, one security feature, what is the huzzah all about?
NATE CARDOZO, Electronic Frontier Foundation: Well, it's not about one phone and it's not about one security feature.
The FBI chose this case to get the precedent8, right? We know who the shooters were. We know who they were talking to. The FBI already has the metadata. They chose this case because they want precedent that they can order a company to design a particular feature at their whim9.
So, when you hear Stewart or the White House press secretary say it's only this one phone, that is simply disingenuous10.
GWEN IFILL: Well, are we talking about precedent here, Stewart Baker?
STEWART BAKER: Well, there is longstanding precedent, 200 years old, that says that if someone has an obligation to help law enforcement to take action, then the government can order other people to help that person carry out his obligation.
If somebody jumps into a cab and says there is a bank robber up ahead, follow that car, the phone — the cab company has an obligation to follow that cab.
STEWART BAKER: So, there is an All Writs12 Act that has been around for almost 200 years that says that essentially13 the government can ask someone who is in a uniquely — unique position to help to assist in carrying out an obligation that law enforcement has.
GWEN IFILL: Nate Cardozo, what slippery slope do you envision here?
NATE CARDOZO: Well, it is more than a slippery slope.
Stewart, as you well know, no court in the United States has ever approved an order of this breadth under the All Writs Act. No court has ever ordered an American company to compromise the security of all of their customers. No court has ever ordered a safe maker14 to make a master key.
And the courts that have addressed it, the Inray (ph), the company, case that, I'm sure, Stewart, you are aware of, the court found that OnStar could not be ordered to subvert15 its emergency phone system and turn it into a wiretap act.
NATE CARDOZO: This isn't just — this isn't just a slippery slope. If the FBI is permitted to get the order in this case, that is it. They will be permitted to get a back door order in every case going forward.
And more than that, Apple will be unable to resist identical demands from China, from India, from Russia. And that is the end of secure devices.
STEWART BAKER: I have to say that the concern here that Apple has is, they have said this phone cannot be cracked. And now it turns out that may not be true. And they would like to suppress that possibility, because they're afraid China or Russia might order them to use that capability16.
China and Russia are perfectly17 capable of ordering Apple to do that tomorrow, whether they have help from a court in this case or not.
GWEN IFILL: You talk about China and Russia. And I want to ask you both this. How — since you brought it up — which is, how do international actors see this kind of discussion that we're having here? Does it make us look weak?
NATE CARDOZO: I think authoritarian18 regimes around the world are salivating at the prospect19 of the FBI winning this order.
If Apple creates the master key that the FBI has demanded that they create, governments around the world are going to be demanding exactly the same access.
STEWART BAKER: Whether or not they do that in response to this order, if it's possible to build that capability, then the Russians and the Chinese are going to order Apple to do it sooner or later, and probably sooner, whether or not the United States tells Apple to do this.
GWEN IFILL: Can I ask you both to be — to make one thing clear? Do you both agree that Apple is capable of doing what they are being asked to do and they're just resisting it on principle, Nate Cardozo?
NATE CARDOZO: We think that Apple is capable of doing it for this generation of phone. The phone at issue is an iPhone 5c, which I guess is two generations back at this point. The iPhone 6 and the iPhone 6s, it is our belief that Apple is probably not capable, at least not capable of using this exact technique to unlock.
But we think they are capable of unlocking the 5c.
GWEN IFILL: And you think that is true, Stewart Baker?
STEWART BAKER: That is what it appears from what Apple has said, that they think they can do it. They choose not to do it, notwithstanding the stakes for terrorism in San Bernardino.
GWEN IFILL: So, if you are the owner of one of these phones which could be unlocked if Apple decided20 to go along with this, how much do — how worried should you be, Nate Cardozo, that your privacy is about to be compromised?
NATE CARDOZO: Well, you know, every individual should create, should do their own threat assessment21.
If you have particularly sensitive data, if you are a human rights worker in Syria, if you are an LGBT activist22 in any country around the world where you may be persecuted23 for your orientation24 or beliefs, make sure to tune25 up your security in response to this. Use a pass code longer than four digits26.
GWEN IFILL: Well, I hope that everyone is doing that anyway. Stewart Baker?
STEWART BAKER: Yes, I — certainly there are times when everyone wants to worry about security. But the idea that the desire for security could trump27 a lawfully28 obtained search warrant to find out whether we're at risk of other people who conspired29 with the San Bernardino shooters right now strikes me as odd.
And for Apple to say well, it interferes30 with our business model and our consumer trust to help the U.S. government find out about this possible additional attacker doesn't make any sense.
GWEN IFILL: This security vs. privacy argument, it sounds to me like it is just going to continue, Nate Cardozo
NATE CARDOZO: You know, it's not security vs. privacy. This is security vs. surveillance. This is security vs. security.
Before Apple instituted this level of encryption on devices, when devices were stolen, they were susceptible31 to any run-of-the-mill hacker32 opening it up. And that is what the FBI wants Apple to return to? That's crazy.
GWEN IFILL: OK. Well, we're going to have to leave it there for now.
Nate Cardozo of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Stewart Baker, former deputy assistant secretary at Department of Homeland Security, thank you both.
STEWART BAKER: Thanks.
NATE CARDOZO: Thank you.
点击收听单词发音
1 killing | |
n.巨额利润;突然赚大钱,发大财 | |
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2 killers | |
凶手( killer的名词复数 ); 消灭…者; 致命物; 极难的事 | |
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3 erase | |
v.擦掉;消除某事物的痕迹 | |
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4 prosecutors | |
检举人( prosecutor的名词复数 ); 告发人; 起诉人; 公诉人 | |
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5 baker | |
n.面包师 | |
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6 permanently | |
adv.永恒地,永久地,固定不变地 | |
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7 erasing | |
v.擦掉( erase的现在分词 );抹去;清除 | |
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8 precedent | |
n.先例,前例;惯例;adj.在前的,在先的 | |
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9 whim | |
n.一时的兴致,突然的念头;奇想,幻想 | |
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10 disingenuous | |
adj.不诚恳的,虚伪的 | |
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11 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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12 writs | |
n.书面命令,令状( writ的名词复数 ) | |
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13 essentially | |
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
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14 maker | |
n.制造者,制造商 | |
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15 subvert | |
v.推翻;暗中破坏;搅乱 | |
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16 capability | |
n.能力;才能;(pl)可发展的能力或特性等 | |
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17 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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18 authoritarian | |
n./adj.专制(的),专制主义者,独裁主义者 | |
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19 prospect | |
n.前景,前途;景色,视野 | |
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20 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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21 assessment | |
n.评价;评估;对财产的估价,被估定的金额 | |
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22 activist | |
n.活动分子,积极分子 | |
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23 persecuted | |
(尤指宗教或政治信仰的)迫害(~sb. for sth.)( persecute的过去式和过去分词 ); 烦扰,困扰或骚扰某人 | |
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24 orientation | |
n.方向,目标;熟悉,适应,情况介绍 | |
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25 tune | |
n.调子;和谐,协调;v.调音,调节,调整 | |
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26 digits | |
n.数字( digit的名词复数 );手指,足趾 | |
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27 trump | |
n.王牌,法宝;v.打出王牌,吹喇叭 | |
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28 lawfully | |
adv.守法地,合法地;合理地 | |
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29 conspired | |
密谋( conspire的过去式和过去分词 ); 搞阴谋; (事件等)巧合; 共同导致 | |
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30 interferes | |
vi. 妨碍,冲突,干涉 | |
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31 susceptible | |
adj.过敏的,敏感的;易动感情的,易受感动的 | |
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32 hacker | |
n.能盗用或偷改电脑中信息的人,电脑黑客 | |
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