英国新闻听力 信用卡诈骗

现在芯片和个人身份识别码是不是又给小偷创造了新的机会，来获取我们信用卡上的信息，再用它来提取现金？

注释：

1.Lloyds TSB 劳埃德信托储蓄银行

2.magnetic adj. 磁的，有磁性的

3.modify vt. 更改，修改

4.counterfeit¹ n. 赝品，伪造品

5.conceal² vt. 隐藏

6.miniaturise vt. 使小型化

7.inoperative adj. 不起作用的

8.recourse n. 求助

9.extend v. 扩充，延伸

10.APACS 英国支付与清算组织

11.device n. 装置

12.undermine v. 破坏

13.malpractice n. 玩忽职守

Credit Card Fraud

LEWIS: Now has chip and pin created new opportunities for thieves to steal the details of our credit cards which they can then use to take out cash? Lloyds TSB confirmed this week that it had seen an increase in the use of cloned cards, namely in foreign cash machines where security is less strict. The admission comes after Shell announced it was suspending the use of pins in its 600 petrol stations after card details from some customers were stolen and their accounts raided. Mike Bond works for the security company Cryptomatic. Has chip and pin given criminals more opportunity rather than less?

BOND: In the past there's been typically 50 or 60,000 ATMs in the UK where people's pins could be collected and now there's hundreds and hundreds of thousands of point of sale terminals. It's the same type of fraud where you capture details and then make a magnetic stripe card copy but it's new targets - it's a new data collection area.

LEWIS: How easy is to do this?

BOND: You can modify a terminal so that's what's been happening often in the past with cash machines - the same can be done for chip and pin terminals. You can replace it with an entire counterfeit - there've been incidences in America and in Europe with entire fake ATMs being set up and then the third option is to set up a concealed³ camera and have somebody using slight of hand to swipe your card through a second machine so that you don't even need to modify the main machine.

LEWIS: If somebody wanted to build a little device to modify one of these hand held pin pads - how easy would that be to do?

BOND: It wouldn't be technically⁴ too hard - certainly the equipment that you would need and the raw parts would not be very costly⁵ - maybe ￡100 at the most but it would take some engineering time and effort to - to develop something and to miniaturise it. The terminals themselves are tamper⁶ resistant⁷ - they will if you try and prize open the casing try and shut themselves down and make themselves inoperative but there's only so much they can do against a persistent⁸ attacker compared with an ATM.

LEWIS: That was Mike Bond. Well once a card is copied and the pin obtained, crooks⁹ can make a fake card and use the pin to withdraw money. Cash machines in the UK may not accept these cards which won't have a chip in them but many machines abroad will. And Lloyds TSB confirmed this it had seen a growth in criminals using fake credit cards mainly in other countries to withdraw cash from UK accounts. Ken¹⁰ Farrow is Head of Financial Crime at Lloyds TSB.

FARROW: It's come on to our radar¹¹ because obviously what the criminals do - they can't break the chip at the moment although I've no doubt that they'll be trying to do that - so what they've done is to recourse back to the old fashion method if I can call it that of skimming the magnetic strips on the cards but they've realized that because the ATMs are enabled in this country - it's been easier to go on to the continent and to other countries in the Far East and so and use them where ATMs are not secured for chip use.

LEWIS: Right, so they can take the sort of old style card and use it abroad and get the cash out more easily?

FARROW: That's right. Of course the existing chip card still has a mag strip attached to it because we wanted to keep the facility available for customers who are travelling.

LEWIS: So what are you doing about this increase of use in foreign cash machines of cards that have been stolen here?

FARROW: What we're doing is to do gradually extend our security blanket if I can call it that to enable us to monitor in real time transaction monitoring of card usage whether it's in the UK or abroad. And obviously making contact to some point if we feel that it looks as though there's something wrong and trying to advice the customer are you in the country that you appear to be or are you still in the UK and has somebody got a cloned card?

LEWIS: How long do you think it will before the chip is cracked?

FARROW: Well that's not for me to say but you know we have to be realistic - criminals are very inventive and we have to keep working to combat the efforts put in by the criminals to crack whatever security measure is put in place.

LEWIS: Ken Farrow of Lloyds TSB. Well with me is Paul Smee, he's Chief Executive of APACS which is the company responsible for chip and pin. Paul Smee, did you realise chip and pin with all those new pin pads would create more opportunities to steal information?

SMEE: Not sure that chip and pin has created more opportunities Paul

LEWIS: Well there's all those pin pads we put our pin in.

SMEE: If you look at the figures in fact hard fraud has dropped by 24% over the last period. Clearly we're up against organized crime and organized crime is trying to get one step ahead of us and we're trying to get - keep one step ahead of them.

LEWIS: Yes - what - the cards are being taken abroad though to try and avoid the steps you're taking in this country because as we understand it, it's easier to draw the cash out. What - how does security work in UK machines though? - Because sometimes fake cards will work there as well won't they?

SMEE: When a bank is looking at its arrangements it has to balance up convenience to customers with security and it is possible that it may allow magnetic strip cards to be used in its cash machines. That's a decision for the bank. If it switches that off and there's a problem with the chip reader obviously there will then be a problem for somebody wanting to withdraw money from that machine.

LEWIS: So it simply is that balance between stopping all crime in this country anyway which they could do in that sense, and the convenience of the customer who wants to draw money out in the rain and there's no cash coming out because his card has been put through the washing machine or something like that?

SMEE: There has to be a balance yeah.

LEWIS: Now you say that the card's more secure and I think one reason is the chip that's in there. You say at the moment no-one's copied that but Ken Farrow from Lloyds TSB says that will just be a matter of time?

SMEE: Well I don't think he quite said that. I mean we do know that there's organized crime and that they will be putting resource into breaking whatever security devices we put in place and we will be pushing back to ensure that our security remains¹² at a high level.

LEWIS: So what are you doing to make things more secure?

SMEE: I think the chip and pin situation has really improved and if you look at the figures and the fall in fraud through claim cards I think you can say this programme has done well.

LEWIS: Yes, I can see the figures but there has been a huge amount of coverage¹³ in the press this week: Shell has stopped using pins - doesn't that all undermine the public's trust in this new system that was supposed to be the answer to fraud?

SMEE: I don't think it was ever said to be the answer to fraud. I'm not going to comment on particular cases. What I would say is that where there is evidence of malpractice it has always been with the old bit of the technology not with the new bit of the technology - the new bit of the technology seems to be working well.

LEWIS: Paul Smee of APACS thanks. And you can tell us what your experience of chip and pin is by having your say on our website.

刘易斯：现在芯片和个人身份识别码是不是又给小偷创造了新的机会，来获取我们信用卡上的信息，再用它来提取现金？这周劳埃德莱斯银行证实，使用克隆卡的案例在上升，并且一般是在国外安全性没有那么严格的现金取款机上使用。而在此之前，壳牌石油公司宣布它将在所属的600个加油站停止个人身份识别码的使用。因为之前发生了一些顾客的信用卡信息泄露，银行帐户被侵吞的事件。麦克·庞德在一家电子安全公司工作。芯片和个人身份识别码会不会给犯罪分子们创造了更多的机会，而不是有所减少呢？

庞德：一般说来，在过去，英国有五到六万台ATM机，人们的个人身份识别码可以在那里获得，而现在有成千上万的销售点终端机。这是同等类型的犯罪，即在销售点终端机窃取详细信息，然后复制一个磁条卡。但是终端机是犯罪分子的新目标--一个新的窃取信息来源。

刘易斯：做这个难度有多大？

庞德：跟过去在现金提款机上一样，你可以把终端机修改一下，含芯片和个人识别码的终端机也能这样修改。你也可以用一个假冒机器来完全代替--在美国和欧洲已经出现了这样的案例，出现了完全假冒的ATM机，另外第三个选择就是安装隐型摄相头，通过另外一台机器，用一束光扫一下你的卡，这样甚至不需要修改主机。

刘易斯：如果有人想装一个小装置去修改这种手持个人识别卡上的信息，这样做会不会很难？

庞德:：技术上不会很难--当然你需要的设备和原始部件都不会很昂贵--也许最多100美金，但是它要花一些精力去研究技术--研发这些东西并且将他们小型化。终端机本身带有干预反抗功能--如果你试图撬开它的现金出口，它将自动关机并且停止运转，与ATM机相比，在面临不达目的不罢休的犯罪分子时，它们能做到的也就那么多。

刘易斯: 那就是麦可·庞德的工作了。一旦磁卡被复制，身份识别码被窃取了之后，犯罪分子就能仿制一张卡，用那个身份识别码来提取现金了。英国的取款机可能不会接收这些没有芯片的卡，可国外的许多提款机会接收。而且劳埃德莱斯银行表示这种使用假卡的犯罪事件正在上升，其中主要是在其他国家的提款机上提取英国帐户上的钱。而肯·法柔是劳埃德莱斯银行金融犯罪部门的负责人。

法柔: 这一切归功于我们的雷达，因为很明显地我们被告知犯罪份子做了什么--他们不能立刻破坏芯片，虽然我毫不怀疑他们会一直想办法这样做--所以他们所做的还是求助于老方法。这样说吧，就是扫描卡上的磁条。但是他们发现在英国的自动取款机上这样做行不通时，就转向欧洲大陆别的国家或是远东的一些国家，在那里可能会容易一些，那里自动取款机对芯片的使用没有这么安全。

刘易斯:：对，那么他们在国外拿着这种老式的卡更容易取出现金，对吗？

法柔：是这样的。当然，现行的含芯片的磁卡上还附有一个磁条，这种设计为出行的顾客带来便利。

刘易斯：在这里窃取信用卡在国外提款机上提取现金的犯罪事件越来越多，针对此情况您将会采取什么措施吗？

法柔：我们现在所做的就是逐渐扩展我们的安全防护范围。这样说吧，就是让我们能够随时监测交易过程中磁卡的使用，无论是在英国本土还是在国外。当然，我们监测到异常情况时，就会联系客户，以确认他们是否在我们监测到的信用卡出现的国家里，或者还在英国，但却有人复制了他们的卡。

刘易斯：你认为在芯片被盗用之后多久能做到上述的这些工作？

法柔：在这个方面我不能确定。我们必须现实地看待这个问题，犯罪分子诡计多端，他们随时会破坏我们建立的任何安全防范措施，所以我们也必须时刻努力，来对付他们的破坏。

刘易斯：劳埃德莱斯银行的肯·法柔，和我在一起的是鲍尔·施密，雅派公司（APACS）的主管。APACS是一家负责芯片和个人身份识别码的公司。鲍尔·施密，你会不会认为所有这些芯片、识别码和新的个人身份识别卡给犯罪分子提供了更多窃取信息的机会呢？

施密：我并不太确定磁卡和个人身份识别码是否提供了更多获取信息的机会，保罗……

刘易斯：这里，我们有所有装着个人身份识别码的卡。

施密：如果你观察一下实际数据，就会发现前段时间内，重大犯罪事件的数目已经下降了24%。很明显，我们正在有效地对抗有组织的犯罪，犯罪集团正力图领先我们一步，而我们要努力地保持走在他们前面。

刘易斯: 是的--什么--带到国外的卡试图避免在国内的这些步骤，正如我们所了解到的，在国外更容易取出现金。尽管这样，在英国的现金取款机上这些安全工作进行得怎么样？--因为我们知道这些仿制的卡在英国有时候也能用，不是吗？

施密：当一个银行在做安排的时候它得在顾客的便利性和安全之间做出平衡。在现金取款机上有可能容许使用磁卡，这主要是为了银行的考虑。如果撤消这个, 

对芯片识别机器来说就有问题了，很明显如果有人想从那台机器上提取现金就会成为一个问题。

刘易斯：因此，它仅仅是两者之间的一个平衡，一方面是阻止这个国家在那种情况下的犯罪，另一方面是解决顾客在临时需要钱的情况下想提取现金而无法取出操作的情况，因为他的卡进过洗衣机或是其他类似的机器。

施密: 对，这两者需要平衡。

刘易斯：你认为现在的卡更安全，我想其中一个原因就是卡里面含有芯片。你说那样的话，目前就没有卡的复制件，但是劳埃德莱斯银行的肯·法柔说那只不过是时间的问题。

施密：我想他的原话不会是这样的，我的意思是说，我们都知道犯罪团伙会想尽办法来破坏我们的安全措施，不管我们设置的是什么样的安全设施，我们也需要尽力保证我们的安全措施维持在一个很高的水平上。

刘易斯：那你在改进安全措施方面有什么新举动吗？

施密：我认为关于芯片和个人身份识别码被盗的情况已经有所改善，如果你去看看这方面的数据以及这方面的犯罪率的下降，我想你可能会说这个项目运转得不错。

刘易斯：是的，我看到了这些数据，但是这周新闻界仍然对这方面做了大量的相关报道。壳牌已经停止了个人识别码的使用--它的这一举措会不会完全动摇公众对这个新系统的信任？新系统可是为了应对犯罪事件而设计的。

施密：我认为这个系统不是为了应对犯罪事件而出台的，我不想针对具体的案件评论什么。我想说的是，每起犯罪的证据都是跟过去的旧技术有关，而不是新技术。看来，新技术运行的还挺好。

刘易斯：谢谢雅派的鲍尔·施密，在我们的网页上你可以告诉我们你在芯片和个人身份识别码方面的经验。

1 counterfeit   

vt.伪造，仿造；adj.伪造的，假冒的

参考例句：

• It is a crime to counterfeit money.伪造货币是犯罪行为。
• The painting looked old but was a recent counterfeit.这幅画看上去年代久远，实际是最近的一幅赝品。

2 conceal   

v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽

参考例句：

• He had to conceal his identity to escape the police.为了躲避警方，他只好隐瞒身份。
• He could hardly conceal his joy at his departure.他几乎掩饰不住临行时的喜悦。

3 concealed   

a.隐藏的，隐蔽的

参考例句：

• The paintings were concealed beneath a thick layer of plaster. 那些画被隐藏在厚厚的灰泥层下面。
• I think he had a gun concealed about his person. 我认为他当时身上藏有一支枪。

4 technically   

adv.专门地，技术上地

参考例句：

• Technically it is the most advanced equipment ever.从技术上说，这是最先进的设备。
• The tomato is technically a fruit,although it is eaten as a vegetable.严格地说，西红柿是一种水果，尽管它是当作蔬菜吃的。

5 costly   

adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的

参考例句：

• It must be very costly to keep up a house like this.维修这么一幢房子一定很昂贵。
• This dictionary is very useful,only it is a bit costly.这本词典很有用，左不过贵了些。

6 tamper   

v.干预，玩弄，贿赂，窜改，削弱，损害

参考例句：

• Do not tamper with other's business.不要干预别人的事。
• They had strict orders not to tamper with the customs of the minorities.他们得到命令严禁干涉少数民族的风俗习惯。

7 resistant   

adj.(to)抵抗的，有抵抗力的

参考例句：

• Many pests are resistant to the insecticide.许多害虫对这种杀虫剂有抵抗力。
• They imposed their government by force on the resistant population.他们以武力把自己的统治强加在持反抗态度的人民头上。

8 persistent   

adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的

参考例句：

• Albert had a persistent headache that lasted for three days.艾伯特连续头痛了三天。
• She felt embarrassed by his persistent attentions.他不时地向她大献殷勤，使她很难为情。

9 crooks   

n.骗子( crook的名词复数 )；罪犯；弯曲部分；（牧羊人或主教用的）弯拐杖v.弯成钩形( crook的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• The police are getting after the crooks in the city. 警察在城里追捕小偷。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• The cops got the crooks. 警察捉到了那些罪犯。 来自《简明英汉词典》

10 ken   

n.视野，知识领域

参考例句：

• Such things are beyond my ken.我可不懂这些事。
• Abstract words are beyond the ken of children.抽象的言辞超出小孩所理解的范围.

11 radar   

n.雷达，无线电探测器

参考例句：

• They are following the flight of an aircraft by radar.他们正在用雷达追踪一架飞机的飞行。
• Enemy ships were detected on the radar.敌舰的影像已显现在雷达上。

12 remains   

n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹

参考例句：

• He ate the remains of food hungrily.他狼吞虎咽地吃剩余的食物。
• The remains of the meal were fed to the dog.残羹剩饭喂狗了。

13 coverage   

n.报导，保险范围，保险额，范围，覆盖

参考例句：

• There's little coverage of foreign news in the newspaper.报纸上几乎没有国外新闻报道。
• This is an insurance policy with extensive coverage.这是一项承保范围广泛的保险。